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DISCRETIONARY DECISIONMAKING:
THE APPLICATION OF TITLE VII'S
DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
Julia Lamber*
I.

INTRODUCTION

For more than a decade courts and commentators have categorized
allegations of discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act' according to two analytical frameworks. The first of these, "disparate treatment" claims, involves allegations of intentional discrimination.
Plaintiffs assert that considerations of race, gender, or some other statutorily impermissible factor influenced an adverse employment decision.2
Proof of impermissible motive is crucial but a court may infer this motive
from differences in treatment. The other analytical framework, "disparate impact" claims, involves allegations of unintentional discrimination.
Plaintiffs challenge facially benign employment policies that fall more
harshly on minority group members than on others.3 Proof of impermissible motive is not essential but the defendant may avoid liability by
proving that the challenged employment policy is central to its legitimate
business interests.
In their traditional and classic forms these two analytical
frameworks serve different purposes and seek to effectuate two different
theoretical conceptions of equality. The disparate treatment theory reflects the equal treatment conception of equality: men and women,
blacks and whites, are entitled to like treatment and considerations of
* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University (Bloomington). B.A. 1969, DePauw University, J.D. 1972, Indiana University (Bloomington). An Indiana University Summer Faculty Fellowship
made possible the completion of this article.
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17
(1982)).
2. Title VII also prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of color, religion, or national origin. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as ADEA], and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)), prohibit
discrimination in employment on the basis of age and handicap, respectively. Although Title VII
and the ADEA clearly apply to employment, the Supreme Court only recently held that § 504 applied to employment discrimination. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984). This
article focuses on Title VII as the principal federal antidiscrimination legislation and the basis for
other statutes and their judicial interpretations.
For convenience this article uses the term "minority group" to identify any social or political
minority-including women.
3. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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race or gender should not influence most employment decisions. In contrast, the disparate impact theory reflects an equal opportunity conception of equality. It imposes an affirmative duty on employers to heed the
disproportionate consequences that occur in the workplace because
structural, historical, or societal barriers have impeded equal achievement. This notion of equality also teaches that arbitrary or thoughtless
employment policies can be just as harmful as intentional
discrimination.'
Each decision of the United States Supreme Court approving the
disparate impact theory illustrates the analytical framework in its classic
form. Each case involved a challenge to a clearly identified, objective
employment policy (applied at a determinative point in the employment
process) that was related causally to the observed adverse impact on minority group members.' Although evidence of adverse impact is crucial
to all discrimination claims, disparate impact claims are not always based
on clearly identified, objective employment policies. Employers often use
multiple selection criteria which may obscure the cause of the observed
disparity in outcomes. Employers also choose employees on the basis of
elusive or intangible qualities such as leadership ability, innovation, or
ability to plan. In other situations the employment decision may be inherently and properly discretionary; the employer may not have any legitimately defensible, objective criterion to distinguish one applicant
from others.
When minority group members fare poorly under such selection systems, plaintiffs usually allege intentional discrimination because of the
4.

For a further discussion of these conceptions of equality embodied in Title VII, see B.

& P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 13-22, 80-190, 1287-88 (2d ed.
1983); C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER, & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT

SCHLEI

1.4, at 16-20 (1980); Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title
VII: DisparateImpact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle,31 UCLA L. REV. 305,
316-17 (1983); Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment
Under Title VII of the CivilRightsAct of 1964 after Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C.L. REV. 419,440-44
(1982); cf. Cox, Substance and Processin Employment DiscriminationLaw: One View of the Swamp,
18 VAL. U.L. REV. 21, 46-47 (1983) (the disparate impact model also may be used to approximate
the disparate treatment model). See also Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Forward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976); Perry, The Disproportionate
Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination,125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977).
5. In Griggs, the Court considered requirements that applicants possess a high school diploma
and pass two standardized intelligence tests, which plaintiffs showed blacks failed at a disproportionately higher rate than whites. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), the Court
focused on the employer's burden of proof to justify the use of standardized intelligence tests, which
plaintiffs showed had an adverse impact on blacks. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977),
concerned Alabama's minimum height and weight requirement for prison guards that plaintiffs
showed excluded nearly 41% of the women and virtually no men. In New York City Transit Auth.
v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979), the plaintiffs challenged the Transit Authority's policy of excluding
participants in methadone maintenance programs from employment but were unsuccessful, in part
because they failed to prove that the rule had an adverse impact on blacks and Hispanic job applicants at the Transit Authority. Finally, in Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982), the Court
rejected an employer's argument that the racially balanced results of its overall promotion process
should excuse the need to justify the use of an aptitude test which blacks failed at a higher rate than
whites.
DISCRIMINATION §
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possibility of bias in the subjective evaluations of candidates. Alternatively, plaintiffs may seek to challenge the selection system itself under
the disparate impact theory. In a promotion challenge, for example,
rather than alleging that disparate treatment was a factor in the evaluation, the plaintiff would allege that women and blacks are concentrated
in the lower levels of the workforce and argue that the employer's policy
of promotion from within does little to change this workforce distribution. Plaintiff then would point to the discretionary nature of initial
placements and the promotion process as the cause of this adverse
impact.
These situations raise the question whether the disparate impact
framework can be used profitably to analyze such discretionary decisions
or to challenge the way objective criteria are used. Specifically, does the
disparate impact theory and its analytical framework apply beyond its
original, but factually narrow, context? If so, what is the nature of the
burden that the employer must bear to justify these challenged practices?
Is the disparate impact theory inappropriate because plaintiffs are merely
alleging a variation of the disparate treatment theory?
The casual observer might conclude that the disparate impact theory and its analytical framework are inappropriate because the use of
discretion is so different from the specific employment policies considered by the Supreme Court in its previous Title VII cases. The reluctance of the lower federal courts to criticize discretionary employment
systems substantiates this view.6 This casual observation, however, does
not offer any conceptual justification for limiting the disparate impact
theory or its analytical framework. Neither the theory itself nor Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. ,' in which the Supreme Court first applied disparate impact analysis, suggests any such limitation.
Choosing the relevant analytical framework for discretion cases
poses undesirable extremes. If disparate impact analysis is inappropriate,
employers can avoid liability by putting all employment criteria in discretionary or subjective form, even when subjectivity is not otherwise desirable from the employer's point of view.' On the other hand, the
analytical framework of the disparate impact theory is not applied easily
to cases of discretion because the defendant's burden of justification
makes the notion of discretion nearly meaningless.
The lower federal courts disagree about disparate impact challenges
6. Carroll v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F.2d 183, 188-89 (5th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Federal
Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 639 (4th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Cooper v. Federal
Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867 (1984); Pope v. City of Hickory, 679 F.2d 20, 22 (4th Cir. 1982);
Mortensen v. Callaway, 672 F.2d 822, 824 (10th Cir. 1982); Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 651 F.2d 609,
611 (8th Cir. 1981).
7. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
8. Employers face countervailing pressures to use objective requirements. As part of the collective bargaining process, unions argue for objective requirements because they limit an employer's
discretion. Managers like objective requirements because they are easy to apply and can reduce the
number of decisions based on only personalities or politics.
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to employee selection systems. Some courts simply accept a plaintiff's
attempt to fit the allegations of the case within the disparate impact
model. 9 Other courts reject the application of the model because discretion cases are factually unlike every case in which the Supreme Court has
approved its application. '0 Still other federal courts focus on the application of the disparate impact theory when the defendant attempts to rebut
an allegation of intentional discrimination with a specific objective employment criterion as its nondiscriminatory explanation."
None of the cases offers a conceptual framework to identify those
factual situations in which disparate impact analysis is appropriate. The
literature is similarly unrevealing.' 2 Nor do most commentators discuss
how the disparate impact model might be adapted to address the different allegations in these cases. 3 The resolution of this controversy is not
merely a problem of developing appropriate statistical evidence or of assigning burdens of proof, although these are relevant, often difficult, and
sometimes determinative matters. The controversy also raises fundamental questions about the conception of equality embodied in Title VII
and the extent to which Title VII presumes a rational, objective world of
employment decisionmaking.
This article addresses the underlying question in these cases-the
extent to which courts should scrutinize the exercise of discretion that
has an adverse impact on minority group members. Of course, discretion
that merely masks discriminatory motivation is impermissible. Similarly,
9. Hawkins v. Bounds, 752 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1985); Hung Ping Wang v. Hoffman, 694 F.2d
1146 (9th Cir. 1982); Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 690 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1982). See also
Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516 (1 1th Cir. 1985), discussed infra text accompanying notes 63-7 1.
10. Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 511
(1984), discussed infra text accompanying notes 72-85; Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795
(5th Cir. 1982), discussed infra text accompanying notes 42-51. See also supra cases cited in note 6.
11. Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Meese v. Segar, 105
S. Ct. 2357 (1985), discussed infra text accompanying notes 52-59. Cf Webster v. Redmond, 599
F.2d 793, 802-03 (7th Cir. 1979) (employer's refusal to promote black plaintiff because of arrest does
not establish either a disparate impact or disparate treatment claim because "arrest" was sufficient
nondiscriminatory explanation under the disparate treatment theory but not an absolute disqualification necessary for the disparate impact theory).
12. Many commentators have discussed the virtues and pitfalls of subjective decisionmaking.
See, e.g., D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION 22-26 (Supp. 1984); B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 191-205, 1288-90; Bartholet, Application of Title VII to
Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 947 (1982); Cooper, Title VII in the Academy: Barriers to

Equality for Faculty Women, 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 975, 991-95 (1983); Maltz, Title VII and Upper
Level Employment-A Response to ProfessorBartholet, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 776 (1983); Stacy, Subjective Criteriain Employment Decisions Under Title VII, 10 GA. L. REV. 737 (1976); Waintroob, The
Developing Law of Equal Employment Opportunity at the White Collar and ProfessionalLevel, 21
WM.& MARY L. REV. 45 (1979); Comment, Subjective Employment Criteria and the Future of Title
VII in ProfessionalJobs, 54 U. DET. J.URB. L. 165 (1976); Note, Title VII and Employment Discrimination in "Upper Level" Jobs, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1614 (1973).
13. Tepker, Title VII, Equal Employment Opportunity, and Academic Autonomy: Toward a
PrincipledDeference, 16 U.C.D. L. REV. 1047, 1085-87 (1983) (arguing that courts should require
employers to demonstrate a policy's effectiveness and validity with substantial evidence even though
the employer lacks the data to establish its effectiveness in a particular case).
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some exercises of discretion with an adverse impact are obviously permissible under Title VII.
This article contends that the disparate impact theory and its analytical framework should not be abandoned in discretion cases simply because these cases are different from typical disparate impact cases or
because the disparate impact theory is difficult to apply. On the contrary, the disparate impact theory provides a useful way to ask the right
questions about discretionary decisions. This article argues for a limited
and principled deference to discretionary decisions. It concludes that
courts should not review the intuition of employers who both knowingly
exercise discretion and intentionally risk winning big in the marketplace
if they are right and losing big if they are wrong. Such deference, however, involves an enormous risk because in exercising discretion employers tend to choose individuals most like themselves. In a world
dominated by white males the risk is that employers will prefer white
males over women and minority group members. Thus, exercises of discretion by employers other than those who play hunches for high stakes
are not entitled to such deference.
Part II discusses early discretion cases and rejects the temptation to
transform discretion cases into straightforward disparate treatment or
disparate impact fact patterns. Part III presents four recent decisions
from four courts of appeals that illustrate the various attempts to challenge discretionary decisionmaking under the disparate impact theory
and the conflicting views of those courts. These inconsistent approaches
suggest that existing theory is inadequate to resolve discretion cases.
Part IV reviews the problems of proving disparities through statistical evidence and of tracing the adverse effect to the challenged practice.
It concludes that these comparison and causation issues are the source of
dissatisfaction in some discretion cases under the disparate impact theory
but that problems with comparison and causation should not prevent the
courts from tackling the underlying issues. Finally, Part V asserts that
courts must resolve discretion cases with an understanding of the different circumstances in which employers exercise discretion. The application of the disparate impact theory turns on such factors as the nature of
the employer, the decision-making process, the definition of general standards, and the kind of job at issue. Arguing for a principled deference in
appropriate situations, the article rejects certain prevailing views such as
the utility of procedural reforms to control discretion.
II.

IDENTIFYING DISCRETIONARY DECISIONMAKING

Discretion in employment decisions typically occurs in two forms.
First, the employer may not have a specific employment practice that
governs its decisionmaking. Second, the employer may have considerable flexibility in applying a certain policy. The essence of discretionary
decisionmaking is that the employer need not distinguish one situation
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from another or one job applicant from another. I4Decisionmaking may
be discretionary because decisions are not routine or recurring, because
meaningful differences are difficult or impossible to articulate, or because
the employer may base a decision on any one of several competing factors. More starkly, no legitimately defensible, objective criterion may exist at all. A judicial unwillingness to require a decisionmaker to detail
permissible differences does not mean, however, that an exercise of discretion based on race or gender is permissible. Discretionary decisions
also are problematic because of the possibility of intentional discrimination and because the outcomes may appear to be unfair.
A. An Early Approach to Discretion
An early decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
Rowe v. General Motors, 5 set the tone for much litigation concerning
discretionary decisionmaking under Title VII. Although the court's theoretical analysis is relatively unsophisticated by today's standards, the
factual context provides a classic illustration of discretionary decisionmaking attacked under Title VII. In Rowe, employees challenged General Motors's system for determining which employees were suitable for
transfer from hourly jobs to salaried positions. General Motors filled positions such as production-line supervisor or clerk from within the plant,
but it had no systematic way to inform employees about either vacancies
in the salaried positions or the necessary qualifications. Although any
transfer or promotion required the approval of the management committee, an employee could initiate the process or the employee's immediate
supervisor could recommend an employee for promotion. Under either
method, a recommendation by the employee's immediate supervisor was
essential. This recommendation was based in part on the supervisor's
subjective appraisal of the employee's "ability, merit, and capabilities."' 6
The court of appeals found this transfer or promotion system impermissible under Title VII and reversed the district court's decision to uphold the system. The appellate court faulted the system in several
respects. First, one person's recommendation was indispensable to the
process. Second, supervisors had no written guidelines for making their
recommendations. Third, standards which GM said were important,
17
such as experience, attendance, and medical or disciplinary records,
were vague and subjective. Fourth, hourly employees were unaware
about promotion opportunities or the qualifications necessary for the
14. In a sense, all decisions-from the pure hunch to the choice of using a clearly defined
objective rule-involve discretion. The kinds of discretionary decisions that are controversial in
terms of the disparate impact theory vary depending on how different the exercise of discretion is
from the objective, identifiable rules found in Griggs and its progeny. Although decisionmakers can
rationalize some discretionary decisions, the point of discretion is to recognize that they do not need
to try. This recognition, however, does not mean that a discretionary decision is arbitrary.
15. 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
16. Id. at 353.
17. Id. at 353 nn.10, 11.
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jobs. And fifth, the procedures provided no safeguards to avert the consideration of race, an impermissible factor in promotions.
Acknowledging GM's affirmative action efforts and the absence of
discriminatory motivation, the court clearly considered the defendant's
liability under the disparate impact theory. Nonetheless, the court did
not specify what evidence showed a disparity in promotional opportunities; it simply noted that few blacks were promoted from hourly jobs to
salaried positions. 8 Nor did the court test the transfer or promotion
system against the standard justification for disparate impact cases,
although it noted "business necessity" as the appropriate justification.
General Motors had argued that any disparity in promotions for blacks
and whites was based on the fact that not as many blacks had the desired
"experience." The court, however, failed to mention that requiring experience would be permissible only if the defendant proved experience was
related to job performance.' 9
The court's major objection was to the informal, unstructured system of promotions, not the promotion standards themselves. The court
believed its job was to determine whether the employer's promotion or
transfer system operated as a barrier against the movement of qualified
workers from hourly jobs to salaried positions despite the employer's
other affirmative "efforts and attitudes all should applaud." 2 ° The court
reasoned that procedures which depend almost entirely upon the subjective evaluation and favorable recommendation of the employee's immediate supervisor are a ready mechanism for discrimination against blacks
"much of which can be covertly concealed and. . . not really known to
management."'" Thus, although the court found no discriminatory motivation, either in the system or in its application, the court premised
liability on the existence of the discretionary system because it could be a
mechanism for intentional discrimination and because the outcomes of
the promotions were so disparate.
B. Supreme Court's Views
The United States Supreme Court has considered the effects of discretionary decisionmaking, although not in response to a direct attack on
the appropriateness of the disparate impact theory for analyzing an employer's use of discretion. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,2 2 plaintiffs
alleged that the company's program of employment testing violated Title
VII under the disparate impact theory. Albemarle required applicants
for skilled jobs, including present employees who wanted to transfer, to
pass two standardized tests that purportedly measured nonverbal intelli18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

id. at 357-58.
Id. at 358.
Id. at 356.
Id. at 359.
422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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gence and verbal ability. After the plaintiffs filed their lawsuit, Albemarle hired an industrial psychologist to study the job-relatedness of
its testing program. The study compared test scores of current employees with supervisors' judgments of the employees' competence; it showed
a statistically significant correlation between some of the jobs and some
of the tests.
The Supreme Court found this validation effort "materially defective in several respects." 2 3 The Court found several obvious difficulties,
such as the use of the tests for all job groupings when the study showed
significant correlations for only some. Even more problematic, neither
the expert nor the employer specified job functions for any of the jobs in
question; without such specification meaningful correlations between
quality of performance on the job and quality of performance on the test
are unlikely.
The Supreme Court also faulted the validation study for its reliance
on subjective supervisor rankings to measure job performance. 24 Acknowledging that supervisor rankings could be used to validate a test, the
Court considered Albemarle's process too haphazard to be useful. Supervisors ranked employees under a vague and ambiguous standard.
Although a job grouping contained a number of different jobs, supervisors determined which employees in each group did a "better job." The
Court noted that it had no way of knowing what criteria of job performance the supervisors used, whether each of the supervisors used the same
criteria, or whether any of the supervisors applied a "focused and stable
body" of criteria of any kind.25
Although the Court discussed supervisor rankings to clarify the
standard of proof in validating pre-employment tests, its concern about
supervisory judgments has broader implications. The Court concluded
its discussion of subjective rankings with the following observation:
"There is, in short, simply no way to determine whether the criteria actually considered were sufficiently related to the Company's legitimate interest in job-specific ability to justify [this] testing system ..
."26 Thus,
the Court's primary objection to the use of supervisor rankings was its
inability to evaluate what the employer had done under the appropriate
justification standard for Title VII purposes. In Albemarle, this justification standard was whether the required tests were related to important
elements of job-specific ability.
When plaintiffs use the disparate impact theory to attack discretion23. Id. at 431. Because few blacks succeeded in their transfer or promotion efforts, the Court
required the employer to show that the tests had "a manifest relationship to the employment in
question." 422 U.S. at 425 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432). In terms of the tests at issue, the Court
stated that this burden would be met if the tests were "shown, by professionally acceptable methods,
to be 'predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior' which are
relevant to the specific jobs in question. Id. at 431 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (c)).
24. 422 U.S. at 432.
25. Id. at 433.
26. Id.
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ary decisionmaking directly, a similar concern exists. If a plaintiff cannot determine what criteria an employer actually used in making various
employment decisions, that employer might avoid an otherwise appropriate burden of justifying its criteria. For example, minority group members may be adversely affected even when an employer evaluates
candidates without bias, if the evaluation taps characteristics that are related to race or gender. These differences in characteristics, if measured
objectively, would trigger a demand for a job-related or business-necessity justification. The Court's opinion in Albemarle does not require all
evaluative criteria to be objective, but it illustrates another problem with
discretionary decisions under Title VII.
The closest the Supreme Court has come to discussing the appropriateness of the disparate impact analytical framework for discretionary
decisions is its opinion in Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters.2 7 Plaintiffs
attacked the hiring system of Furnco, which did not maintain a permanent workforce but hired a superintendent for a specific job and delegated to him the task of finding a workforce. This superintendent hired
persons he knew to be experienced or who others recommended to him
as similarly qualified. He did not accept applications in advance and did
not hire at the job site. Although twenty percent of the resulting
workforce was black, the three black plaintiffs alleged that the superintendent's failure to hire them was racially discriminatory in violation of
Title VII under both the disparate impact and disparate treatment
theories.
In rejecting the plaintiffs' challenge, the Supreme Court analyzed
the claim only under the disparate treatment theory.28 Unanimously, it
held that although the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of
intentional discrimination the court of appeals had placed an inappropriate burden of proof on the employer for rebuttal. Subsequent judicial
refinement of the disparate treatment analytical framework makes clear
that this burden is merely one of going forward with sufficient evidence
to dispel the adverse inference that arises from the plaintiff's circumstantial evidence.29 The employer need not advance a business necessity,
27.

438 U.S. 567 (1978).

28. Id. at 575. The opinion is ambiguous about its relevance to the plaintiffs' disparate impact
claim. Although the majority says that "those matters which are still preservedfor review are best
decided by the Court of Appeals in the first instance," 438 U.S. at 581 (emphasis added), Justice
Marshall dissents from "the Court's apparent decision to foreclose on remand further litigation on
the Griggs question of whether petitioner's hiring practices had a disparate impact." Id. at 583
(citation omitted). Arguably, the disparate impact claim was not properly before the Supreme
Court. The district court held that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action under either theory,
but the court of appeals considered only the disparate treatment claim because that was a sufficient
basis for reversing the district court's judgment. Waters v. Furnco Constr., 551 F.2d 1085, 1088-90
(7th Cir. 1977). The subsequent decision of the court of appeals shed no light on the ambiguity
because it did not discuss the issue. Waters v. Furnco Constr., 688 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1982).
29. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (the defendant's burden
in rebutting a claim of individual disparate treatment is the burden of production, not persuasion).
See also United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983) (plaintiff is not required to use
direct evidence to establish prima facie case of intentional discrimination; courts should not use
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merely a nondiscriminatory explanation for its refusal to hire the
plaintiffs.
Although Furnco's specific holding is narrow and unexceptionable,
language in the Court's opinion has implications for the broader question
of the appropriateness of using the disparate impact analytical framework to challenge discretionary decisions. In agreeing with the court of
appeals that the proper approach was the disparate treatment analytical
framework, Justice Rehnquist noted that "[t]his case did not involve employment tests, which we dealt with in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., and in
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, or particularized requirements such as
height and weight specifications considered in Dothard v. Rawlinson
",30

The point of this footnote is unclear. The most obvious reading is
that the Court was explaining why it did not consider the plaintiffs' disparate impact claim: the disparate impact analytical framework was inappropriate because the plaintiffs were not challenging a test or other
"particularized" requirement. The practices that the plaintiffs challenged in Furnco, however, are like those that courts traditionally have
analyzed within the disparate impact framework. The plaintiffs claimed,
and the employer did not dispute, that the employment practice was not
to take applications in advance, not to hire persons applying at the job
site, and not to consider applicants unknown to the superintendent or his
surrogate.31 Despite this apparent similarity, the Court did not explain
why disparate impact analysis is so limited. Nor did it suggest any standard by which to predict which employment practices are sufficiently
"particularized" to fit this suggested limitation.3 2
The employer clearly intended to raise this precise question. One of
the three questions advanced in the employer's petition for certiorari asks
"whether a hiring practice. . . may be found to be racially discriminatory.

. .

merely because it is subjective. . .

."3

The Court avoided the

issue, stating only that the failure to adopt a system maximizing the hiring of minority applicants is an insufficient basis from which to infer intentional discrimination.34
preliminary burdens of proof to avoid ultimate factual question of whether intentional discrimina-

tion existed, on which plaintiff always has burden of persuasion).
30. 438 U.S. at 575 n.7 (citations omitted).
31. Id. at 583-84 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The plaintiffs also
alleged that the "list" from which the superintendent hired included only white bricklayers with
whom he had worked. Id. at 580 n.9.
32. Perhaps we should not make too much of footnote 7. Justice Rehnquist recently noted
that, although he used to think footnotes in Supreme Court opinions were important, he no longer
does. Jenkins, The Partisan: A Talk with Justice Rehnquist, N.Y. Times Magazine, Mar. 3, 1985, at
31.
33. 438 U.S. at 575 n.6.
34. Id.at 577-78. The Court also said that, in the absence of other evidence supporting a Title
VII violation, a court could not impose what it thought was a more reasonable hiring system. Id. at
578.
Cooper, supra note 12, at 992, draws a different conclusion from Furnco: Because the Court did
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C.

Simple Solutions

These cases illustrate the kind of discretionary decisionmaking that
plaintiffs have attacked under Title VII's disparate impact theory. Some
cases question the application process-whether there is notice of openings, whether the employer takes applications, how the employer uses
recommendations. Other cases attack the process of evaluating applicants. Courts may be tempted to resolve the question of whether the
disparate impact analytical framework is applicable by categorizing the
particular practices at issue. That is, the use of a standard paper and
pencil test, if it has an adverse impact on minority group members,
would be subject to disparate impact analysis because it is similar to
those practices challenged in Griggs and its progeny. The use of an unstructured interview, which is neither scored nor standardized among applicants, would not be subject to the disparate impact analysis framework
because it differs so from Griggs. In the latter situation no known or
objective standard measures success, an adverse decision about the applicant cannot be pinpointed in time, and any observed disparity in the selection process might not result from a decision made in the interview.3 5
Under this view, consider an employment scheme in which the employer makes no formal announcement of openings and the individuals
hear of the opening from friends or relatives presently employed.
Whether this "word-of-mouth" hiring would be subject to the disparate
impact analytical framework is unclear because one cannot decide easily
whether such a scheme is more like the paper and pencil test in Griggs or
an unstructured interview. Opinions will differ and the failure of footnote seven in Furnco to explain the distinction suggests that this line of
analysis is unlikely to be productive.3 6 Moreover, reifying this distinction shifts attention away from the fundamental issue-the value and
harm of discretionary employment decisions.
Courts and commentators have suggested that discretionary employment systems are more troubling for lower level jobs than for upper
level jobs.37 Intuitively, the selection of a "management team" requires
flexibility, judgment, and good luck. Discretion may be unnecessary to
not consider the disparate impact claim, it "appears that the Supreme Court is unwilling to apply
impact analysis to subjective criteria." She does not explain this conclusion.
35. But see Shoben, The Use of Statistics to Prove Intentional Discrimination,46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 224 (1983) (arguing that interview can be broken down into component parts
which employer can justify).
36. See Levit & Mahoney, The Futureof Comparable Worth Theory, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 99,
120 n. 147 (1984) (the distinction between an employer policy and an employer practice is murky; if
disparate impact theory only applies to employer policies and not to employer practices, courts must
define what constitutes mere policy and what constitutes a full-scale practice).
37. E.g., Shidaker v. Bolger, 593 F. Supp. 823, 834 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (the validity of subjective
devices increases in direct proportion to the level of employment sought). See also B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 199-201; Cooper, supra note 12, at 982-84; Maltz, supra note 12, at 78993; Waintroob, supra note 12, at 48-51; Comment, supra note 12, at 228-29. Cf Bartholet, supra
note 12, at 1006-07 (purely objective criteria are not necessarily good on the lower level and these
criteria certainly do not make sense on the upper level).
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fill lower level jobs. Title VII, however, does not distinguish between the
level or the importance of the jobs in question.38 This proposed line of
argument also is unsatisfactory because it does not address the legitimacy
of discretion in a particular situation.
Finally, one must distinguish the appropriateness of the disparate
impact theory to discretionary decisions from those situations in which
an employer applies criteria, whether objective or not, unevenly on the
basis of race or gender. For example, an employer may question whether
a particular applicant has experience, how to define experience, or which
of the applicant's prior activities count as experience. These questions
often are problematic because the decision whether an applicant is qualified according to the employer's criteria, even when those criteria are
legitimate, may place the employer's judgment in question. Although
these issues raise difficulties, they differ fundamentally from the issue of
whether discretionary decisionmaking can be the subject of a disparate
impact challenge.
III.

THE CASES

In the ten years following the Fifth Circuit's decision in Rowe v.
General Motors, many lower federal courts retreated from Rowe's easy
treatment of discretionary decisionmaking. In some cases the courts analyzed challenges to discretionary employment schemes only under the
disparate treatment analytical framework. 39 In many of these cases the
courts refused to infer intentional discrimination on the part of the employer, finding plausible any explanation for the challenged selection system." In other cases the courts rejected challenges because plaintiffs'
statistical evidence was insufficient to support the preliminary but basic
fact that employment practices disproportionately affected minority
group members. 4 The Fifth Circuit's own opinion in Pouncy v. Prudential Insurance Co. ,42 however, ignited the recent debate over whether the
disparate impact analysis applies to discretionary decisionmaking.
38. Drawing a negative inference is legitimate because ADEA § 12(c)(1) illustrates that Congress does so explicitly (permitting compulsory retirement at age 65 for certain "bona fide executive
or a high policymaking" employee). 29 U.S.C. § 631(c)(1) (1982).
39. Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388, 394 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
822 (1982); Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 651 F.2d 609, 611 (8th Cir. 1981); Wright v. National
Archives & Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 712-13 (4th Cir. 1979).
40. Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 651 F.2d at 611; Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1045-48 (10th
Cir. 1981); Mazus v. Department of Transp., 629 F.2d 870, 874-75 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1126 (1981); Thompson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 416 F. Supp. 972, 982 (E.D. Mo. 1976),
afl'd, 552 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1977).
41. Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d at 1042-43; Smithers v. Bailar, 629 F.2d 892, 899 (3d Cir. 1980);
Carroll v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 514 F. Supp. 788, 799-805, 810-14 (W.D. La. 1981), modified, 708
F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1983) (affirmed district court finding of no discrimination in hiring; reversed
district court finding of no discrimination in promotion); Anderson v. U.S. Steel Corp., 19 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1215, 1218 (N.D. Cal. 1979); EEOC v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
445 F. Supp. 223, 240-43, 251-52 (D. Del. 1978).
42. 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982).
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A.

Pouncy: Reviving the Controversy

In Pouncy, the plaintiff alleged that Prudential had discriminated
against its black employees by systematically failing to promote them.
Affirming the district court's decision in favor of the employer, the court
of appeals concluded that the plaintiff's evidence, "mostly statistics,
failed to show that Prudential's black employees were treated differently
from white employees in terms of promotions, compensation, and in their
use throughout Prudential's workforce." 3 Not only did the court express concern about the quality of plaintiff's evidence, it also sharply limited the applicability of the disparate impact theory itself.
The plaintiff introduced four statistical comparisons to show that
Prudential discriminated against black employees. First, he presented
evidence showing that, for employees hired between 1973 and 1977, the
mean weekly salary of white employees exceeded that of black employees
hired in the same year. Second, he presented evidence showing that in
each year, from 1973 to 1975, the percentage of blacks promoted to managerial and supervisory positions was less than the percentage of blacks
in Prudential's workforce. Third, he demonstrated that before promotion to some jobs, black employees had a greater mean number of years
of service with Prudential than did white employees. Finally, but most
importantly, he introduced evidence showing that from 1973 to 1975
blacks were clustered in the lower levels of Prudential's workforce and
underrepresented in upper levels when compared with their percentage
in Prudential's workforce and with the workforce as a whole.
This over- and underrepresentation of blacks occurred although
most jobs had no specific experience or educational requirements.
Pouncy also argued that blacks remained at the lower levels, notwithstanding Prudential's policy of internal promotion, because of three employment practices: (1) Job vacancies were not posted or otherwise made
known to employees; instead, supervisors selected the employees for promotion. (2) Prudential's "level system," through which clerical employees often were hired at entry level positions and subsequently promoted
to better jobs, retained black employees at the lowest paying and least
skilled jobs. (3) Prudential used subjective criteria to evaluate employee
job performance and to determine promotions."
The district court in Pouncy found the plaintiff's statistics flawed.
Therefore, the plaintiff had not shown the adverse impact necessary to
support a disparate impact claim or to shift the burden of proof to the
defendant.4 5 In contrast, the court of appeals found the plaintiff's theory
43. Id. at 798.
44. The court of appeals characterized Pouncy's challenge as an attempt to fit his proof into
the disparate impact model by arguing that the three practices were responsible for the disparities
shown. It is difficult, and perhaps unnecessary, to separate the three practices; the essence of
Pouncy's challenge was the unstructured promotion process that left blacks clustered in the lower
level jobs.
45. In each area of dispute, the district court accepted the employer's statistical analyses,
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flawed. Stressing the limited nature of employment practices that a
plaintiff may challenge under the disparate impact theory, the court
stated that the theory was not "the appropriate vehicle from which to
launch a wide ranging attack on the cumulative effect of a company's
employment practices." 4 6 According to the court, disparate impact analysis applies only to a specific procedure that a plaintiff can show has a
causal connection to a class-based imbalance in the workforce. The
court of appeals rejected the use of the disparate impact model, approved
by other courts, to challenge multiple employment practices simultaneously. The court reasoned that because of its origins, the disparate impact theory is limited to overt, clearly identified, nondiscretionary
selection criteria applied at a single point in a selection process.
Although the court of appeals might have affirmed the district
court's decision on the basis of the plaintiff's inadequate statistical evidence, it did not. Instead, the court of appeals held that none of the three
employment practices is "akin to the 'facially neutral employment practices' the disparate impact model was designed to test. Unlike educational requirements, aptitude tests, and the like, the practices identified
by Pouncy are not selection procedures to which the disparate impact
model traditionally has applied." 4 7
The court also articulated a second basis for its decision: the plaintiff failed to show a causal connection between the challenged neutral
practice and the racial imbalance in Prudential's workforce. According
to the court, even if plaintiff's evidence were adequate, he did not show,
and could not have shown, that "independent of other factors the employment practices he challenge[d] have caused the racial imbalance in
Prudential's work force." 48 The court required the plaintiff to establish
the causal connection so that the court could allocate fairly the parties'
respective burdens of proof at trial. The court further explained that if
the plaintiff did not identify the specific employment practice responsible
for the adverse impact, then the employer would be forced to justify all
its requirements.
Thus, one question raised by Pouncy is whether the crux of the decision is simply the plaintiff's failure to show a causal connection between
the challenged practices and the evidence of adverse impact or the inapwhich showed no adverse impact, over the plaintiff's analyses. 499 F. Supp. 427, 449-66 (S.D. Tex.
1980).
Determinations about the correct statistical evidence can be technical and complicated, see infra
text accompanying notes 89-110. For a more general discussion, see D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra
note 12; Campbell, Regression Analysis in Title VII Cases: Minimum Standards, Comparable Worth,
and Other Issues Where Law and StatisticsMeet, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1299 (1984); Lamber, Reskin &
Dworkin, The Relevance of Statistics to Prove Discrimination: A Typology, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 553
(1983); Comment, JudicialRefinement of Statistical Evidence in Title VII Cases, 13 CONN. L. REV.
515 (1981).
46. 668 F.2d at 800.
47. Id at 801.
48. Id
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plicability of the disparate impact theory and its analytical framework.4 9
If the former, then much of what the court says about the limited nature
of the disparate impact theory is dicta. At best, the factual context of the
case limits the discussion: given the evidence available to the plaintiff, he
could not prove an essential element of a disparate impact case-the adverse effect of a selection criterion. His evidence was faulty, not his
theory.
If the plaintiff's failure to prove cause is the point of the court's
decision, Pouncy still is an important case, but not because it limits the
applicability of the disparate impact model. Instead, Pouncy raises two
questions about permissible inferences and suitable comparisons in disparate impact cases. The first question is whether a court should infer that
a connection probably exists between the three practices challenged and
the clustering of black employees at the lower levels of the workforce.
Such an inference would not necessarily require the defendant to justify
each employment practice, because the employer could offer some other
explanation for the apparent causal connection.
The second question is what comparison is appropriate to prove adverse impact. In a traditional disparate impact case, the plaintiff shows
the comparative success or failure rate for blacks and whites, given a
certain employment rule. For example, plaintiffs might challenge a nepotism rule: to be a member of a certain work group, one must be related
to a present member of the group. The best evidence compares the percentage of blacks or women disqualified by the rule with the percentage
of whites or men disqualified. Evidence that blacks or women are underrepresented in the particular workforce in question, while not irrelevant,
is only indirect evidence of the rule's impact. Without the direct comparison of success or failure rates, evidence of underrepresentation requires
the court to infer from the underrepresentation that the rule disadvantages blacks more than whites, or women more than men. Thus,
Pouncy's statistical showing that blacks were underrepresented in the
workforce when compared to their percentages in the employer's
workforce and in the workforce as a whole was only indirect evidence of
the effects of the challenged rule.5 °
If, however, the inappropriateness of the disparate impact theory
49. Whatever the basis of the court's decision, its statement that traditional use of the disparate
impact model does not allow plaintiffs to challenge multiple practices simultaneously is inaccurate.
In Griggs the plaintiffs challenged the employer's requirements of both a high school diploma and
passing scores on two standardized tests. The court in Pouncy probably wanted the plaintiff to
isolate the effects of each requirement. The court made another technical mistake in assuming that
the plaintiff could not isolate the effects of the three challenged practices. Although the facts in
Pouncy may have precluded such a showing, the technical ability to do so exists. See, e.g., Campbell,
supra note 45; Finkelstein, The JudicialReception of Multiple Regression Studies in Race and Sex
Discrimination Cases, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 737 (1980).
50. Such indirect evidence also was a problem in New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440
U.S. 568 (1979). The next section discusses the statistical comparisons and causation issues in
greater detail. See infra text accompanying notes 89-121.
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and its analytical framework required the court's decision, regardless of
the statistical comparisons and the causal relationship, then the adequacy
of the court's reasons for limiting the utility of the disparate impact theory becomes crucial. 1 A recent decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit provides insights into both
bases.
B.

Segar: Another View

In Segar v. Smith,5 2 plaintiffs launched a wide-ranging attack
against the federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), alleging racial discrimination in salary, promotion, initial GS grade assignments, work assignments, supervisory evaluations, and disciplinary actions. Plaintiffs
presented a range of statistical and anecdotal evidence to show that DEA
paid blacks less than whites, that blacks were less likely than whites to be
hired at GS-9 rather than at GS-7, and that blacks fared worse in work
assignments, supervisory evaluations, discipline, and promotions. The
defendant argued that plaintiffs' evidence was insufficient to support an
inference of intentional discrimination by challenging the accuracy and
significance of plaintiffs' statistical evidence. The defendant also argued
that even if the court accepted the plaintiffs' statistical evidence, DEA
had effectively rebutted the plaintiffs' showing of discrimination.
In affirming the district court's liability determination, the court of
appeals understood the plaintiffs as proceeding under both the disparate
treatment and the disparate impact theories. Plaintiffs alleged intentional racial discrimination in the employment system as a whole and
challenged a number of DEA's specific employment practices such as
initial grade assignments, work assignments, supervisory evaluations, discipline, and promotion decisions. The court of appeals recognized the
different aims and proof sequences of the two models but also noted that
each claim involved a showing of disparity between the minority and
majority groups in an employer's workforce.5 3
The DEA's defense in large measure stood or fell with its argument
that the disparities plaintiffs sought to show were nonexistent. One aspect of DEA's argument, however, amounted to an effort to provide a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for the purported disparity:
DEA argued that a difference in prior law enforcement experience would
account for any observed disparity in the opportunities available to black
agents. According to this argument, black special agents appeared to do
less well throughout DEA's employment system because they tended to
51. In Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d 608, 620 (5th Cir. 1983), a different panel of the Fifth Circuit followed Pouncy but made plain that it did so reluctantly. In Page v.
United States Indus., 726 F.2d 1038, 1045-46 (5th Cir. 1984), the Fifth Circuit appeared to retreat
from its holding in Pouncy (court can analyze plaintiff's claims of discrimination in promotion based
on subjective evaluations under either model).
52. 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
53. Id. at 1267.
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start lower in that system as a result of their relative lack of more than
one year prior law enforcement experience.5 4
The court of appeals was unconvinced that the defendant made a
credible showing that the requirement of an additional year of law enforcement experience explained the disparity in opportunity for black
agents. The court noted, however, that upon such a showing the court
would have required the DEA to show the job-relatedness of such a requirement. This burden is appropriate, reasoned the court, because in
offering this explanation the defendant put before the court all the elements of a traditional disparate impact claim: plaintiffs had shown disparity and defendant had pinpointed the facially neutral employment
practice causing the disparity.5"
In its analysis, the court of appeals expressly noted the reluctance of
the Fifth Circuit in Pouncy to apply the disparate impact analysis in this
kind of situation. According to the court in Segar, two concerns influenced this reluctance. First, the Pouncy court perceived as unfair the
defendant's dual burden of articulating which of its employment practices caused the adverse impact at issue and proving the business necessity of the practice. Second, the Fifth Circuit disliked the risk that an
employer would be forced to justify the entire range of its employment
practices when a plaintiff showed only that a disparity existed. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals found these concerns unpersuasive as
well as inconsistent with the purposes of Title VII.
The court reasoned that the litigation context in which this issue
arises makes the Fifth Circuit's concerns irrelevant. Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of intentional discrimination on the basis of
statistical disparities, an employer advances some nondiscriminatory explanation for the disparity to avoid liability. One explanation an employer might offer is that a specific job qualification or performance
measure caused the observed disparity. In Segar, for example, the DEA
suggested that blacks do less well with the agency because of their lack of
prior law enforcement experience. Such an argument may dispel an inference of intentional racial discrimination by suggesting the experience
requirement, not racial discrimination, explains the disparity in employment. The argument also should trigger, however, a demand for justification of the previous experience requirement no less than if the plaintiff
had challenged the requirement directly. This application of the disparate impact model does not place an additional burden on the employer;
it simply describes one of several available methods for rebutting claims
of intentional discrimination. The employer must justify the previous experience requirement because the employer relies on it to avoid the dispa54. Id. at 1273, 1274-77. The defendant made this argument in the context of an attack on the
legal sufficiency of plaintiffs' prima facie disparate treatment case but the court noted that the claim
also is a possible nondiscriminatory explanation for the disparity and analyzed it as such.
55. Id. at 1270.
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rate treatment claim. Under this application, the employer does not have
to justify all its practices, as the Fifth Circuit worried. The employer
justifies only the practice used to dispel the inference of intentional
discrimination.
The District of Columbia Circuit found that this application of the
disparate impact model effectuates the policies of Title VII because it
allows challenges to subtle barriers to equal employment opportunity.
By requiring the plaintiff to pinpoint the employment practice causing
the disparity in all cases, courts would permit challenges only to those
readily perceptible, obvious barriers. Subtle or unknown barriers would
continue to work their discriminatory effects. Thus, when litigation of an
intentional discrimination claim exposes employer-created barriers,
stated the court, the policy of Title VII requires that employers justify
such barriers.5 6
By affirming the district court's liability determination in its entirety, the court in Segar also approved a far-reaching aspect of the lower
court's decision. The district court held not only that DEA had engaged
in a pattern of intentional racial discrimination in its treatment of black
special agents but also that DEA's initial grade assignments, work assignments, supervisory evaluations, imposition of discipline, and promotion process had a disparate impact on black agents.5 7 The court ordered
validity studies "to implement effective, nondiscriminatory supervisory
evaluation, discipline, and promotion systems .. ."58 Interestingly,
DEA did not challenge the trial court's application of the disparate impact model to these employment practices.
Although the court of appeals upheld this controversial application
of the disparate impact theory, it did not elaborate on its reasons for
doing so. Nor did the court discuss the nature of the burden a defendant
would have if it attempted to validate the challenged procedures. The
court merely noted that the trial court had neither precluded elements of
subjective decisionmaking in DEA's practices nor invalidated the propriety of the traits that DEA's current practices sought to measure. Instead, the court suggested that the validation studies would provide more
specific guidance to decisionmakers and eliminate those elements of discretion that affect black agents adversely without any compensatory
showing of business necessity.5 9
C.

Griffin and Spaulding: Point Counterpoint

Subsequent decisions by other courts of appeals parallel either
56. Id at 1270-72. This result also avoids judicial inefficiency. Once employees know that an
employer uses a specific criterion which explains an already observed adverse impact, a subsequent
lawsuit challenging the criterion directly surely will follow.
57. Segar v. Civiletti, 508 F. Supp. 690, 712-15 (D.D.C. 1981).
58. Id at 715.
59. 738 F.2d at 1288 & n.34.
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Pouncy or Segar. ° In many cases the opinions merely announce a view,
without much elaboration. In contrast, two recent cases, Griffin v. Carlin 6 and Spaulding v. University of Washington,62 provide a clear illustration of the split among the circuits and take opposite views on the
method of analyzing the challenges to and the defenses of nonobjective
employment criteria.
In Griffin, black employees and former employees challenged the
United States Postal Service's promotion methods as well as the practice
of "detailing" an employee into a higher level position that was vacant or
temporarily unfilled. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' disparate impact claims because their pleadings failed to specify which employment
practices would be challenged under this theory and because the plaintiffs could challenge only objective, facially neutral employment practices
under a disparate impact theory. After trial, the court also held that
plaintiffs had failed to prove intentional discrimination, finding plaintiffs'
statistical evidence flawed and unpersuasive. The Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit reversed.
The Jacksonville Post Office promotes persons to supervisory positions almost entirely from within its workforce. The promotion process
had changed several times during the period covered by the lawsuit but
getting on the "supervisory register" remained the key to promotion.6 3
By 1978, eligibility for the supervisory register depended on supervisory
assessment and self-assessment but not on a written examination. Promotion advisory boards interviewed and recommended eligible candidates for promotion; the Postmaster made the final selection.
In addition to challenging the subjective judgments involved in getting on (and off) the supervisory register, plaintiffs claimed that the practice of "detailing" an employee to an open position and then relying on
that experience when filling the position had a disparate impact on
60. Cases that follow Pouncy include: Johnson v. Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 34 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1742 (1st Cir.) reh'g denied, 731 F.2d 64 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 433 (1984);
Talley v. United States Postal Serv., 720 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2155
(1984); Pope v. City of Hickory, 679 F.2d 20, 22 (4th Cir. 1982).
A case that follows Segar is Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1526-28 (11th Cir. 1985); cf
Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 542-45 (7th Cir. 1985) (if employer relies on possibly
biased factor as legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to rebut claim of intentional discrimination,
plaintiff has burden to prove the adverse impact of the factor before employer must justify it).
61. 755 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1985).
62. 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984).
63. In 1968, the Post Office used two written examinations, one for vehicle services and one for
the post office branch. To be placed on the supervisory register and to be eligible for promotion,
employees had to attain a particular score on the examination. The Postal Service placed the top
15% of the employees on the register in the "zone of consideration" and notified them of supervisory
vacancies. In 1972, the Postal Service eliminated the zone of consideration standard; instead, supervisors evaluated and graded persons who had attained a passing score on the examination. Those
persons receiving an "A" rating were eligible for immediate promotion. In 1976, the examination
was eliminated; instead, employees were required to complete a training program as a precondition
for promotion. In 1978, the Postal Service initiated the Profile Assessment System for Supervisors
(PASS) which made eligibility for the supervisory register dependent on both supervisory assessment
and self-assessment. 755 F.2d at 1520.
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blacks. Plaintiffs argued that assignment to a detail increased an employee's chances for a permanent promotion and that blacks were underrepresented among those receiving detail assignments compared to their
availability among eligible employees.
Plaintiffs' statistics showed that although thirty-five percent of the
workforce was black, blacks held only five percent of all supervisory jobs
in 1969 and only twenty-one percent in 1981. Plaintiffs' statistics also
indicated that blacks were promoted to supervisory positions in numbers
far lower than expected from 1964 through 1976. The key, argued the
plaintiffs, was the underrepresention of blacks on the supervisory registers. In 1977, for example, 1,590 workers comprised the entire craft
workforce: 949 whites and 641 blacks. Of the 107 workers on the register, 81 were white and 26 were black. Thus, blacks constituted forty
percent of the available pool but only twenty-four percent of the supervisory register. Stated differently, only four percent of blacks succeeded in
getting on the register while eight and one-half percent of whites were
successful.' 4 The government argued that the promotion process had no
adverse impact. Under its view, the appropriate pool for supervisors, and
thus the appropriate group for determining underrepresentation, was
those individuals on the supervisory register. The district court adopted
the government's approach and concluded that there was no evidence of
adverse impact against blacks seeking supervisory positions.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the lower court's statistical
comparisons. It reasoned that when promotions are made almost exclusively from the internal workforce and when the primary qualification for
promotion is experience in the craft workforce, the appropriate comparison is to this larger workforce rather than to those on the supervisory
register. 65 The agency already had evaluated this latter group and that
evaluation was part of the selection process the plaintiffs challenged. The
court of appeals also rejected the trial court's conclusions about the detailing procedure because they were based on the same statistical assumption that black underrepresentation on the register explained why blacks
were underrepresented in the detail positions.6 6
The court of appeals then reversed the trial court's outright dismissal of the plaintiffs' disparate impact claims. Initially, the Eleventh Circuit read former Fifth Circuit precedents, which it concluded were
binding, to allow plaintiffs' disparate impact challenges to the end result
of multi-component selection processes and to subjective elements of
those processes. 67 The court then held that, even if these prior Fifth Cir64. Id. at 1520-21 & n.3. Although the absolute difference is small, it is statistically significant.
Different ways to present disparate impact evidence are discussed infra text accompanying notes 93110 and note 99.

65.
66.
67.

755 F.2d at 1526.
Id. at 1528-29.
Id. at 1523. Congress created the Eleventh Circuit in 1980. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, § 2, 94 Stat. 1994 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 41
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cuit cases were not binding, it would not follow the Pouncy decision of
the current Fifth Circuit for three reasons.
First, the court noted that the Supreme Court has never differentiated between objective and subjective barriers when it discussed or applied the disparate impact theory. The Court's discussions, from Griggs
to Teal, do not limit the theory or indicate that a plaintiff could not make
a disparate impact challenge to a promotional system as a whole. The
court of appeals noted that the Court spoke in terms of "practices" and
"procedures," terms which encompass more than isolated, objective
components of a process.6"
Second, the court of appeals argued that limiting the disparate impact theory would encourage employers to use subjective rather than objective selection criteria. Instead of validating educational and other
objective criteria, employers simply could take such criteria into account
in subjective interviews or review-panel decisions. The court did not believe that Congress intended to encourage employers to use such devices
as opposed to validated objective criteria.69
Third, the court noted that the Uniform Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures interpret the disparate impact model to apply to all
selection procedures.7" The Uniform Guidelines broadly define a selection procedure as "[a]ny measure, combination of measures, or procedure used as the basis for any employment decision."'" The Guidelines
(1982)). The new Fifth Circuit includes Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas and the Eleventh Circuit
includes Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. Fifth Circuit decisions prior to October 1, 1981, are binding on the Eleventh Circuit and cannot be overruled except by the court acting en banc. Bonner v.
City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981).
The Fifth Circuit decisions on which the court relied were Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 628
F.2d 419, 426-27 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated, 451 U.S. 902 (1981), modified and aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 657 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982) (the court applied a disparate
impact analysis to a promotion system based on the use of subjective supervisory evaluations); Crawford v. Western Elec. Co., 614 F.2d 1300, 1328 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying disparate impact analysis to
index review system involving subjective elements); and Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d
348, 354-55 (5th Cir. 1972), discussed supra text accompanying notes 15-21. Curiously, the Fifth
Circuit panel in Pouncy did not discuss or distinguish these cases.
68. 755 F.2d at 1524.
69. Id. at 1525.
70. Id.
71. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.16(Q) (1985). The broad applicability of the guidelines is controversial
but primarily in terms of whether employers must validate nonscored selection criteria. Compare
Greenspan v. Automobile Club, 495 F. Supp. 1021, 1034 n.15 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (rejecting defendant's argument that validation is not required to justify prior experience requirement) with League of
United Latin Am. Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873, 900-02 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that educational requirements must be validated according to EEOC
guidelines). Compare Bartholet, supra note 12, at 989 (fundamental principles of validation apply to
all selection procedures) with Lerner, Employment Discrimination: Adverse Impact, Validity, and
Equality, 1979 Sup. Cr. REV. 17, 39 (formal validation is not necessary to justify selection procedures in all cases). More recently the Seventh Circuit found that judicial and professional experience
with educational requirements in law enforcement was sufficiently extensive to establish a presumption that a high school diploma is an appropriate requirement for a police officer or corrections
officer and that the "exacting criteria" of the Uniform Guidelines apply more to tests than to educa-
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give as examples formal or casual interviews and unscored application
forms.
The Eleventh Circuit did not, however, illuminate the employer's
burden of proof under the disparate impact theory for these allegations.
Although the lower court had not considered the disparate impact claims
and thus had not discussed the defendant's burden, some guidance would
have been helpful for future cases. Such guidance is especially necessary
because one of the reasons courts hesitate to apply the disparate impact
theory to discretionary decisions is the fear of placing undue hardship on
employers.
In contrast to the Eleventh Circuit's approval of using the disparate
impact theory to challenge discretionary decisions, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit rejected disparate impact analysis in Spaulding v.
University of Washington.72 Although the facts in Spaulding suggest a
comparable worth claim, the court explicitly discussed whether the disparate impact theory applies beyond its original context.
Plaintiffs, present and past faculty members of the School of Nursing, challenged the university's compensation practices, arguing that the
policy of setting wages according to market prices for jobs in the discipline adversely affected members of the nursing school faculty. Plaintiffs'
evidence showed that the university paid members of the nursing faculty
less than some male faculty members in other fields. The plaintiffs did
not, however, compare the effect of the policy on female as opposed to
male faculty members. Affirming the district court's dismissal of the
plaintiffs' claims on all theories, the court of appeals held "where plaintiffs' sex-discrimination claim is a wide-ranging claim of wage disparity
a
between only comparable jobs, the law does not go so far as to allow
73
prima facie case to be constructed by showing disparate impact."
Comparable worth cases raise two questions in terms of the disparate impact theory. The first is unique to wage claims under Title VII
and involves the relationship between the disparate impact theory and
the fourth affirmative defense under the Equal Pay Act, which authorizes
tional requirements. Aquilera v. Cook County Police & Corrections Merit Bd., 760 F.2d 844, 847
(7th Cir. 1985).
Similarly, some commentators argue that it is impossible to justify discretionary decisions and
conclude that the disparate impact theory therefore is inappropriate. See infra note 172. Although
validation is a useful method for determining whether job performance correlates with a selection
procedure, the technique is not inherently superior to other forms of evidence. At most, validation
represents expert testimony, but experts can base their opinions on other information or express their
opinions in other ways. The appropriate focus at this stage of Title VII litigation should be on
whether there is a substantial relationship between the challenged employment practice and an important employer interest. The article discusses this issue infra text accompanying notes 171-81.
72. 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984).
73. Id. at 706. Although the court clearly treated the plaintiffs' case as raising a comparable
worth claim ("We confront then the difficult question whether the disparate impact model is available to plaintiffs who . . . make a broad ranging sex-based claim of wage discrimination, based on
comparable worth." Id. at 705), the plaintiffs repeatedly disclaimed having presented any comparable worth theory. Id. at 710 (Schroeder, J., concurring).
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pay differentials between men and women if "based on any other factor
other than sex."' 7 4 In County of Washington v. Gunther," the Supreme
Court held that Title VII wage claims did not require a showing of unequal pay for substantially equal work. Nevertheless, the Court explicitly
refused to decide how Title VII plaintiffs should structure gender-based
wage discrimination claims to accommodate the fourth affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act.76 This question is now the focus of debate in
the lower federal courts and the literature. In short, the issue is whether
the Court's recognition of intentional discrimination in Gunther signals
the outer limits of Title VII liability for gender-based wage discrimination claims.7 7
The second question raised by comparable worth cases is not peculiar to wage claims and involves the applicability of the disparate impact
theory more generally. The court in Spaulding said "[t]he case before us
simply does not fit into the disparate impact model."' 78 The four concerns underlying this rejection echo the Fifth Circuit's fears as expressed
in Pouncy. First, the plaintiffs' claim is unlike those to which courts have
applied the disparate impact theory in the past. When plaintiffs use the
disparate impact model in cases not involving clearly delineated neutral
policies of employers, the court said, the model becomes too vague to
apply.79
74. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982). The statute also permits employers to pay unequal wages for
similar work if the pay differentials are based on 1) a seniority system, 2) a merit system, or 3) a
system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production. Because Title VII also allows
pay differentials on the basis of these factors, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982), these exceptions do not
present the same potential for inconsistent regulation.
75. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
76. 452 U.S. at 171 ("[W]e do not decide in this case how sex-based wage discrimination litigation under Title VII should be structured to accommodate the fourth affirmative defense of the
Equal Pay Act").
Spaulding, brought in 1974 and tried in 1977, suffered in part from the confusion the Court
resolved in Gunther concerning whether Title VII plaintiffs must satisfy the equal work provisions of
the Equal Pay Act to bring a sex-based wage claim under Title VII. Because of this doctrinal confusion, plaintiffs had not tailored their evidence to support a bare comparable worth claim based on the
disparate impact theory.
77. Stated differently,,the issue is whether plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case of wage
discrimination under the disparate impact theory by alleging simply that women in predominantly
female jobs are paid lower wages than males in predominantly male jobs when the jobs, although
dissimilar, are of equal worth to the employer. Compare Power v. Barry County, 539 F. Supp. 721
(E.D. Mich. 1982) (no) with American Fed'n of State, County, & Mun. Employees v.. Washington,
578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983) (yes), rev'd, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985). See also State
Employees Ass'n v. Connecticut, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 191, 193 (D. Conn. 1983) (denied
defendant's motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs claimed intentional wage discrimination and did
not rely solely on disparate impact comparable worth theory, implying that in the absence of a
showing of intent, the court would have dismissed the case). The theory of comparable worth has
been the subject of lively debate. See, e.g., M. GOLD, A DIALOGUE ON COMPARABLE WORTH
(1983); COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES (E. Livernash ed. 1980); WOMEN,
WORK, AND WAGES: EQUAL PAY FOR JOBS OF EQUAL VALUE (D. Treiman & H. Hartmann eds.

1981); Levit & Mahoney, supra note 36; Comment, Comparable Worth, DisparateImpact, and the
Market Rate Salary Problem: A Legal Analysis and StatisticalApplication, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 730
(1983).
78. 740 F.2d at 707.
79. Id. at 708.
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Second, the court understood the disparate impact theory as merely
a proxy for intentional discrimination claims. According to the court,
the theory exists as a form of pretext analysis to handle specific employment practices not obviously job-related, such as intelligence tests,
mandatory maternity leaves, and reference to arrest records. What matters is the substance of the employer's acts and whether those neutral
acts are a non-job-related pretext to shield an invidious judgment.8 °
Third, the court was concerned with the plaintiffs' failure to establish a causal connection between the observed adverse impact and the
challenged policy. The court began its disparate impact analysis by saying that plaintiffs must prove the discriminatory impact at issue, not
merely circumstances raising an inference of adverse impact.8 The
plaintiffs claimed to have pinpointed the facially neutral policy causing
the adverse impact but the court found that they had not.82
Finally, the court reasoned that market forces constrain every employer in setting labor costs, so the employer's reliance on the market
does not qualify as a facially neutral policy under the disparate impact
theory. Market prices are inherently job-related, the court remarked,
although the market may embody social judgments about the worth of
some jobs. 3 Because employers accept the market as a given fact, they
do not have any meaningful "policy" about it in terms of Title VII.
Moreover, by allowing plaintiffs to use "reliance on the market" as a
facially neutral policy, courts would subject employers to liability for pay
disparities about which employers have not made an independent
judgment.8 4
The plaintiffs also asserted that the university's "discretionary budgetary policies" based on subjective considerations supported the disparate
impact analysis. The court rejected that claim too, stating that "the lack
of well-defined criteria as facilitating wage discrimination is a claim better presented under the disparate treatment model." 85
D.

The Need for a Theory

These four decisions illustrate plaintiffs' various attempts to challenge discretionary decisions under the disparate impact theory as well as
the conflicting views of the courts of appeals. They do not compel support for any particular view. The decisions hint at the underlying issues
but do not focus on them in any systematic way. Some decisions appear
80. Id. at 707, 708.
81. Id. at 705. Whether plaintiffs must satisfy the causation requirement with direct evidence
is discussed infra text accompanying notes 112-20.
82. Id at 708. According to the court, not only did the plaintiffs fail to pinpoint a policy
having a discriminatory impact, the court emphasized that such a practice is not the sort of policy
subject to disparate impact analysis.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 709.
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to be foregone conclusions. Others raise issues, such as the defendant's
burden of proof, but fail to address how the typical burden of justification
applies to discretionary decisions. The inconsistent approaches suggest
that existing theory is inadequate to resolve the problems of discretionary
decisionmaking.
An expanded theory would encompass the common but difficult allegations in this area. Consider, for example, an employer who chooses
higher level employees from those performing lower level jobs in its
workforce. For many reasons, women are concentrated in the lowerlevel jobs while supervisors are predominantly men. The employer bases
promotions on supervisor selection and evaluation. After a number of
years under this scheme, women are not promoted in large numbers to
higher level jobs; they remain concentrated in the lower levels of the
workforce.8 6 Or, consider the practice of categorizing jobs as either
"classified" or "exempt." Exempt employees are typically those filling
jobs with unique or unstandardized requirements while those in "classified" jobs are subject to more regulations in terms of maximum hours,
overtime, or other workplace restrictions. The employer's categorization
of jobs may have an adverse impact on the salaries of female employees.
In most situations, classifying jobs as "exempt" means that the employer
has a wider range of discretion to establish salaries.8 7 Here, the challenged practice is clearly different from such well-defined, objective employment practices as personnel tests or minimum physical requirements.
This difference, however, may not necessarily require a different analysis.
Still, if the disparate impact theory and its analytical framework apply
how does the employer justify the classification scheme?
In other situations supervisors may have nearly total control of the
process. Supervisors might determine on an ad hoc basis the selection
criteria for a particular job to be filled by internal promotion. Even when
a separate committee reviews, ranks, and forwards the names of individuals found to be "highly qualified," the process can have an adverse impact on minority group members or women if the employer's notion 8of8
"desirable traits" is based on the model of a white, male employee.
Similarly, employers may release employees for "poor workmanship" or
86. See Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1980) (in the context of
class action certification, court noted that the "commonality" requirement was more difficult to meet
for plaintiffs attacking subjectively based pay and promotion systems).
87. See Heagney v. University of Wash., 642 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1981) (disparate impact
analysis inappropriate because challenged practice was so different from those challenged in Griggs
and its progeny).
88. See Hung Ping Wang v. Hoffman, 694 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1982) (to prevail on disparate
impact theory plaintiff need only demonstrate the lack of objective criteria and a disparity in job
promotions).
Courts also reach different conclusions about whether an employer can choose employees on the
basis of particular characteristics that it knows one applicant has and another applicant lacks. Compare Verdell v. Wilson, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 216 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (discriminatory) with
Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 235 (D.D.C. 1985) (no
discrimination).
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"insubordination." Subjective judgments on what constitutes "poor
workmanship" may have an adverse impact on women or blacks. The
unarticulated factors used to decide the required quality of the work or
the level of behavior may touch characteristics that correlate with gender
and would, if objectively stated, demand a justification.
IV.

STATISTICS AND CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS

The controversy over the appropriateness of the disparate impact
theory to challenge discretionary decisionmaking may result from the
problem of proving statistical disparities or of tracing the observed disparity to the challenged employment practice. That is, courts may be
reluctant to use the disparate impact analytical framework because of
these issues rather than because of any limitation within the disparate
impact theory itself. Moreover, the statistics and causation issues are
interrelated: without the appropriate statistical comparisons plaintiffs
may be unable to prove a causal connection.
Defendants can attack any disparate impact claim by denying that
the challenged practice has a meaningful adverse impact on the minority
group in question.89 Defendants either challenge the accuracy or significance of the plaintiffs' statistical evidence or argue that the challenged
employment practice does not cause the observed adverse impact. The
issue, on which the plaintiff has the burden of proof,9 ° is whether the
disproportionate results in the instant case will exist when additional decisions are made over the long run.9 1 For example, if an employer selects
one black and three whites from a pool of five blacks and five whites, the
question is whether similar results will occur over the long run when the
same process is applied to additional candidates.
This part of the article reviews how plaintiffs use statistics and establish causation in typical disparate impact cases. It then looks at discretion cases to demonstrate the similarity of issues and the differences in
evidence and arguments. It concludes that the statistics and causation
issues are the source of dissatisfaction in some judicial decisions about
discretion but that, if properly understood, these issues should not prevent courts from applying the disparate impact theory to discretionary
decisions.
89. Defendants also can attack disparate impact claims by admitting the existence of the disparity and the causal effect but then attempting to justify the use of the selection criterion. This
defense is discussed infra text accompanying notes 171-81.
90. D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 12, at 48. Because the plaintiff has the burden of proof
to show that the employment practice has a substantial adverse effect, the consequence of the employer negating the impact is to prevent the plaintiff from making its prima facie case. In contrast,
defendant has the burden of persuasion on the justification issue.
91. The plaintiff has the burden of discounting the probability that an observed adverse impact
was a "chance" result, rather than a consequence of a race- or gender-sensitive selection criterion.
Id. A related issue is whether the plaintiff has used the appropriate comparison group to establish a
disparity. See infra text accompanying notes 93-99.
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UnderstandingAdverse Impact in Typical DisparateImpact Cases

Evidence of substantial adverse impact is essential to all disparate
impact claims.92 Observers of Title VII litigation recognize that various
statistical comparisons can show disparate impact. Although some commentators summarize the variations differently, two basic comparisons
exist.9 3 First, statistics may compare the percentage of minority group
members disqualified by an employment requirement with the percentage
of majority group members also rejected on that basis. This article terms
such comparisons "comparative" statistics. Within this comparison, evidence might show how the system actually operates, by using actual applicants, or how the system would operate if applied to a population of
potential applicants. For example, in Connecticut v. Teal,94 the plaintiffs
alleged that the written test for promotion to welfare supervisor had a
disparate impact on black applicants. The plaintiffs introduced actual
applicant data showing that fifty-four percent of blacks passed the test
compared to eighty percent of whites." In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the
Court relied on more general population data to conclude that the employer's requirement of a high school diploma had a greater effect on
blacks than whites.96
92.

How much disproportionality constitutes a prima facie case is unclear. See D. BALDUS &
P. GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 1368-75. C. SULLI4, at 46-51. The Uniform Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1985), establish a "four-fifths rule" of thumb: "A selection
rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths. . . of the rate for the group with
the highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact, while a greater than four-fifths rate will generally not be regarded by Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact." Id. at 1607.4(D).
Plaintiffs also use evidence of adverse impact in many disparate treatment claims. Because of
the need to infer discriminatory motive from the disparity, such claims typically require greater
disproportionality for a prima facie case than do disparate impact claims. See C. SULLIVAN, M.
ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 4, at 21-23. See also infra note 102.
93. See, e.g., Shoben, Probing the DiscriminatoryEffects of Employee Selection Procedureswith
DisparateImpact Analysis Under Title VII, 56 TEX. L. REv. 1, 6-9 (1977) (three distinct methods of
proving impact); Note, Rebutting the Griggs Prima Facie Case Under Title VII. Limiting Judicial
Review of Less Restrictive Alternatives, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 181, 189-91 (discussing three types of
statistical comparisons that can be sufficient to establish substantial disparity). The primary difference is when actual applicants, rather than some proxy of applicants, constitute a separate comparison. See infra notes 96, 98. The text uses only two comparisons because the point is to illustrate the
nature and the direction of the comparisons and not to resolve the issue of actual or proxy applicant
pools, which arises in both kinds of comparisons. On the latter issue, see D. BALDUS & J. COLE,
supra note 12, at 101-41; Lamber, Reskin & Dworkin, supra note 45, at 585-87.
94. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
95. 457 U.S. at 443 n.4.
96. 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971). The Court relied on census data that showed 34% of whites
but only 12% of blacks had high school diplomas in North Carolina, the general population from
which Duke Power hired. Similarly, in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), the plaintiff
used national population data to show that a height and weight minimum disqualified 41% of the
women and less than one percent of the men. This evidence was not limited to Alabama because the
court found no reason to believe that the physical characteristics of Alabama men and women differed markedly from those of the national population. Id. at 329-30.
For Shoben, the comparison suggested in the text is two different comparisons, one based on
population data and one based on actual applicants.
J.

COLE, supra note 12, at 47-50; B. SCHLEI &
VAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note
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Second, statistics may compare the percentage of minority group
members in the defendant's workforce with the percentage of minority
group members in the community from which the employer hires. This
article terms such comparisons "representation" statistics. Within this
type of statistical comparison, the evidence might show that blacks are
underrepresented in the employer's workforce compared to the racial
composition of the relevant labor market or compared to a more general
population. For example, in Hazelwood School District v. United States,
the plaintiff alleged that blacks were underrepresented as teachers in the
Hazelwood school district compared to the racial composition of teachers in the relevant labor market.97 In Teamsters v. United States, the
Court relied on more general population data to conclude that blacks and
Hispanics were underrepresented as over-the-road truck drivers.9"
In a world of complete information plaintiffs would be able to compute each type of comparison and the use of one rather than the other
should not matter. 99 Given the necessary data, the plaintiffs in Griggs
The first method of proof calls for an examination of the effect of the requirement on the
general population group from which defendant employer hires. It entails a comparison of the
percentage of blacks or women in the general population excluded by a particular employment
requirement with the percentage of whites or males in the general population that would be
excluded by the requirement. . . . The second method of proof of disparate impact consists of
an examination of the pass-fail rates of actual applicants. The failure rate of black or female
applicants on a particular test or other scored requirement is compared with the failure rate of
white or male applicants.
Shoben, supra note 93, at 6-7. In Note, supra note 93, at 189, the comparison of actual or potential
black applicants disqualified by the employer's requirement with the percentage of actual or potential white applicants rejected on that basis constitutes only one comparison.
Commentators disagree over whether to state these comparisons positively, in terms of pass or
success rates, or negatively, in terms of failure rates. See Booth & MacKay, Legal Constraints on
Employment Testing and Evolving Trends in the Law, 29 EMORY L.J. 121, 153-54 (1980) (whether
courts focus on pass or fail rates can make a significant difference in the apparent magnitude of the
disparity).
97. Although the parties agreed on the "relevant labor market" as the appropriate comparison
population, they disputed how to define that group. Plaintiff argued that the percentage of teachers
in the school district should be compared to the percentage of teachers in the metropolitan area. The
defendant argued that the percentage of teachers in the school district should be compared to the
percentage in the metropolitan area excluding the City of St. Louis. 433 U.S. 299, 310-11 (1977).
The district court had used another comparison common to school desegregation cases, that of students to teachers, which the Supreme Court rejected as clearly inappropriate here. Id. at 308.
98. 431 U.S. 324, 337 & n.17 (1977) (terminals in areas of substantial black population where
all the company's line drivers were white).
For Shoben, supra note 93, at 8-9, this is one comparison (a third method of proof that compares the racial composition of the defendant's workforce with the racial composition of the community in which defendant hires). In Note, supra note 93, at 189-91, this is two different comparisons,
one based on the area's labor pool and one based on general population (a comparison of blacks in
defendant's workforce with the percentage of blacks in the geographical area's labor pool; a comparison of the percentage of blacks in defendant's workforce with the percentage of blacks in the geographical area's general population).
Although the examples in the text illustrate the difference in statistical comparisons, plaintiffs
can use both comparisons in the same case to attack the same selection criterion. In Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1977), the plaintiff showed not only that the height and weight
criterion had an adverse effect on women but also that women were underrepresented as prison
guards compared to their proportion in the labor market.
99. For example, one can compute the data in Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1521 n.3 (1 1th
Cir. 1985), discussed supra text accompanying note 64, both ways. (Statistics are for May 1977.)
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could have computed the overrepresentation of blacks among those without high school diplomas. Litigants, however, rarely have complete information. Moreover, these two comparisons reflect differences between
the two theories of discrimination under Title VII: comparative statistics
express the basis of the disparate impact theory and representation statistics form the essence of intentional, but covert, discrimination claims.
In Griggs the Court defined disparate impact claims in terms of the
adverse impact of an employment practice that the defendants could not
justify. The Court said that Congress had "directed the thrust of the Act
to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation. "l° Applying this standard, the court of appeals in Pouncy said that
"[a] prima facie case [under the disparate impact theory] is shown by
identification of a neutral employment practice coupled with proof of its
discriminatory impact on the employer's workforce."'' l The comparative statistics outlined above, which compare the success or failure rate
for blacks and whites, show this impact directly.
The other statistical comparison, representation statistics, most
often supports the inference of intentional discrimination. The Supreme
Court's acceptance of the probability theory to support Title VII claims
gives this comparison probative value. In Teamsters the Court said that
"absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the
community from which employees are hired.""' 2
Pool

Black

White

Total

107
81
26
Selected/on register
1483
868
615
Not Selected/not on register
1590
949
641
Total/craft labor force
Comparison 1: The success rate for blacks [26/641 =4%] compared to the success rate for
whites [81/949=8.5%]. Comparison 2: The percentage of those successful who are black
[26/107=24%] compared to the percentage of those available for selection who are black
[641/1590=40%].
100. 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
101. 668 F.2d at 800.
102. 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977).
In a truly random process, such as jury panel selection, this use of the probability theory is
straightforward. One compares the racial composition of the jury panel actually selected with the
racial composition of those eligible. If this comparison shows that blacks are underrepresented and
the actual outcome would rarely occur if the process were random, then the comparison provides
persuasive evidence that the process in fact was not random. Although no one expects employment
decisions to be random, nondiscriminatory decisions should generate, over the long run, random
results with respect to race or gender when these characteristics are irrelevant. Thus, evidence of
long-standing and gross disparity between the composition of a workforce and that of the general
population or labor market can be important because, given the evidence of availability, the courts
are willing to infer, absent rebuttal, that race or gender is the basis of the employment decision. For
a more general discussion, see M. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW (1978); Smith
& Abram, QuantitativeAnalysis and Proofof Employment Discrimination, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 33
(1981); Sugrue & Fairley, A Case of Unexamined Assumptions" The Use and Misuse of Castaneda/Hazelwoodin DiscriminationLitigation, 24 B.C.L. REV. 925 (1983); Note, Beyond the Prima
Facie Case in Employment DiscriminationLaw: StatisticalProof and Rebuttal, 89 HARv. L. REV.
387 (1975).
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In the ordinary disparate impact case, comparative statistics make
sense because they satisfy the causation requirement of Title VII. The
key questions in a challenge to an obvious, automatically applied, objective criterion are whether applying the criterion falls more harshly on
blacks than whites, or on women than men, and whether the criterion is
justified despite its adverse impact. Because comparative statistics
pinpoint an employment practice and illustrate its adverse consequences
on majority and minority group members, the evidence links the employment practice with group status by specifying what would happen to applicants or potential applicants under each criterion. 0 3 For example, in
Dothard v. Rawlinson, the plaintiffs challenged a height and weight minimum for prison guards and showed that the rule would disqualify fortyone percent of the women and almost none of the men." And in Teal,
the plaintiffs showed that a written test for welfare supervisors disqualified forty-six percent of the black applicants but only twenty percent of
the white applicants.° 5
If the plaintiffs in Dothard or Teal had been able to show only that
women or blacks were underrepresented as prison guards or welfare supervisors relative to their proportion in the labor market, then the evidence would not have established the causal connection between this
underrepresentation and the challenged rule.'0 6 Similarly, if the plaintiffs had attacked another practice, such as hiring from selected schools
or promoting on the basis of productivity, evidence of the adverse effect
of the height and weight rule or written test would not have established
103. Title VII prohibits discrimination with respect to terms, conditions, and privileges of employment because of race or gender. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982). Further, an employer cannot
deprive (or tend to deprive) an individual of employment opportunities because of an individual's
race or gender. Id at § 2000e-2(a)(2). Thus, the plaintiff must establish a connection between race
or gender and the adverse action challenged. An employment practice that is merely unusual or
arbitrary is insufficient for a Title VII claim. See also New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440
U.S. 568, 598 n.3 (1979) (White, J., dissenting) ("The failure to hire is not 'because of' race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin if the adverse relationship of the challenged practice to one of those
factors is purely a matter of chance-a statistical coincidence"). In Teal, Justice Powell confused
the need to show that a practice actually excludes individuals defined in terms of their group status
with the need to measure that impact at a particular point in the selection process. In defending the
bottom line principle, he said that there "can be no violation of Title VII on the basis of discriminatory impact in the absence of disparate impact on a group." 457 U.S. at 459. Although Powell
correctly states the disparate impact theory, his statement does not resolve the question at issue
there, which is when to measure that impact.
104. 433 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1977).
105. 457 U.S. at 443 n.4. To complete the causation statement, one also needs to know that
failing the test excluded the applicants from further consideration.
106. Similarly, in Beazer, the plaintiffs claimed that the Transit Authority's rule against hiring
people who were in methadone maintenance programs adversely affected blacks and Hispanics because they were overrepresented in such programs. The best approach would have compared the
proportion of blacks, Hispanics, and whites disqualified by the rule (a comparative statistic). Instead, the plaintiffs' evidence compared the proportion of blacks and Hispanics in such programs
with their proportion in the relevant labor market (a representation statistic). Because the plaintiffs
were challenging the adverse effect of the Transit Authority's no-drug rule, this evidence provided
only indirect support. As Justice White pointed out in dissent, however, the Court could have inferred the impact of the rule from this evidence. 440 U.S. at 598-602 (White, J., dissenting). See also
infra text accompanying notes 112-15.
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the causal connection. 0 7
Although deciding on the correct statistical evidence can be technical and complicated,10 8 causation is not ordinarily a problem in typical
disparate impact cases. When causation is a problem, the issue is
whether an uncontested employment practice or the chance selection of
an atypical sample caused the observed disparity in results rather than
the challenged practice. Under the first alternative, an employer argues
that other considerations, rather than the challenged requirement, caused
the observed impact.10 9 Under the second alternative, an employer argues that random factors unrelated to race or gender produced the disparity. For example, fifty whites and fifty blacks comprise an employer's
universe of test takers and forty whites and twenty blacks pass the test.
The plaintiff will claim that the test is sensitive to some characteristic of
the candidates that correlates with race. The employer will argue that
the observed results are unlikely to occur over the long run when additional candidates take the same test.' 1 0
B.

Meaningful Adverse Impact in Discretion Cases

Statistical evidence in discretion cases does not always resemble that
found in typical disparate impact cases because plaintiffs do not challenge an obvious, automatically applied employment criterion. Thus,
they cannot directly measure the criterion's impact on minority group
members to demonstrate a causal connection between the criterion and
group status. Plaintiffs might not use comparative statistics common to
disparate impact cases but may rely on representation statistics to show
the under- and overrepresentation of minority group members.
Consider, as the court of appeals did, the statistical evidence in
Pouncy in terms of the typical disparate impact case.'
Comparative
statistics formed some of the evidence and the plaintiff challenged specific
107.

Of course, if the other practice had an adverse impact the defendant would need to justify

it.
108. See supra notes 92-98.
109. A typical assertion is that blacks and women have not applied for certain jobs, accounting
for their lower numbers. Applicant pool data, however, is sometimes skewed. See International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365-67 (1977); D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note
12, at 103-14.
110. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Richmond, 456 F. Supp. 756, 771 (E.D. Va. 1978) (disparate impact claim failed because the number of test takers was too small to conclude that the test was
sensitive to race); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 255 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The
applicants for employment in the District of Columbia Police Department represent such a small
fraction of the total number of persons who have taken the test that their experience is of minimal
probative value in assessing the neutrality of the test itself."). See also D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra
note 12, at 288-328 (tests of statistical significance helpful in assessing arguments about chance).
Evidence about the long-run effect is especially important when the selection criterion in question involves performancerather than some race- or gender-linked attribute (where the effect is fairly
predictable) and the statistical evidence is based on only a sample of the potentially affected population. Lamber, Reskin & Dworkin, supra note 45, at 585-90.
111. 668 F.2d at 801, 802-04 (although the court apparently did not accept the plaintiff's statistics as accurately reflecting the condition of black employees in the company's workforce).
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rules, but his evidence did not measure the impact of the rules he challenged. Although each statistical comparison could have been relevant
to his claim, the plaintiff made little effort to explain the relationship of
the comparisons to the rules. For example, representation statistics
showed that blacks received promotions at a rate lower than their proportion in the employer's workforce and that blacks were overrepresented in the lower levels and underrepresented in the upper levels
of the workforce. These comparisons certainly are related to the effect of
promotion standards but they do not measure directly the impact of the
promotion system. Comparative statistics showed that the mean salary
of blacks was less than the mean salary of whites and that blacks had
more years of service before promotion than whites. These comparisons
better express the claim of disparate impact, but they are not obviously
related to the specific rules the plaintiff challenged.
A different view of Pouncy, however, is possible. Pouncy argued
that subjective evaluations were the reason blacks had been relatively unsuccessful in receiving promotions for which they were eligible.
Although Pouncy did not establish a direct causal link between the subjective evaluations and the evidence of adverse impact, his evidence does
suggest that some component of the promotion scheme touches characteristics that are related to race, which, if stated objectively, would require justification.
Some courts and commentators argue that the disparate impact theory is inappropriate here because it applies only when plaintiffs can show
11 2
that a specific procedure caused a class-based adverse impact.
Although this argument accurately describes typical disparate impact
cases, it is not the only way to show discrimination on the basis of race or
gender. The procedural issue is whether Pouncy established a prima facie case under the disparate impact theory. The doctrinal issue is
whether he established that an employment practice has a long-run racial
adverse effect. These issues are the same in both typical disparate impact
cases and discretion cases but the evidence and arguments may differ.
The first problem under this view of Pouncy is the circumstantial
nature of Pouncy's adverse impact evidence. By showing that the promotion evaluations harm proportionately more blacks than whites,
Pouncy's evidence implied that these evaluations discriminatorily affected promotions. The evidence was circumstantial because Pouncy had
evidence only of the system's impact generally and not of the particular
factors that might be related to race." 3 Although typical disparate im112. Id. at 800.
113. For example, if an employer hires on the basis of an unstructured interview, the plaintiff
would show the racial composition of those interviewed and the racial composition of those hired.
In effect, the interview as a whole is the challenged employment practice, because the plaintiff does
not know what specific parts of the interview triggered the adverse effect. Characterizing the interview as the employment practice is not, however, a complete solution to the issues of discretionary
decisionmaking in terms of the disparate impact theory, see supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
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pact cases often have direct evidence showing the effects of the challenged objective rule, circumstantial evidence is sufficient. Courts must
draw an inference from the circumstantial evidence, however, and perhaps courts' reluctance to do so explains why plaintiffs lose on this issue.
Another explanation is that courts confuse the utility of an identifiable
rule or criterion with the nature of the impact evidence. In Pouncy, for
example, the court stated that without an identifiable rule the plaintiff
could not show a causal connection between the promotion process and
the observed adverse impact."1 4 Although the plaintiff could not show
causation directly, the question should have been whether his circumstantial evidence showed causation indirectly."1 5
The second problem under this view of Pouncy is that random factors may produce short-run results suggesting racial impact which would
not continue over the long run. Although this issue also arises in typical
disparate impact cases, the subjective nature of the decision-making process makes the problem more acute in discretion cases. Intuitive or unconscious preferences of individual decisionmakers often affect
discretionary decisions and the impact of such preferences may be unknown or unmeasurable.1 16 When these intangible influences produce
disparate results in the short run, litigants must determine their long-run
effects on majority and minority group members.
For example, five women and, five men with similar formal qualifications apply for four positions as administrative assistants. The employer
selects one woman and three men. Given the small number of decisions,
a court would find it difficult to conclude that the subjective and impressionistic factors will favor males over the long run. With a larger sample,
however, the likelihood of such disparate results may be small enough
for
117
a court to reject the hypothesis that chance caused the disparity.
Although challenging the interview may be sufficient for the plaintiffs prima facie case, the question
remains how to scrutinize those decisions reached in interviews.
114. 668 F.2d at 801.
115. The circumstantial evidence also supports the disparate treatment claim that Pouncy
made. Pouncy, 668 F.2d at 802.04. Evidence is circumstantial in a disparate treatment case because
the ultimate factual issue is the employer's intention. Given the technical and somewhat controversial nature of statistical evidence, plaintiffs in situations like Pouncy should make clear the purpose of
their statistical evidence and argue directly the reasonableness of drawing an inference from it, as
they commonly do in disparate treatment cases. See, e.g., Payne v. Travenol Labs., 673 F.2d 798,
826-27 (5th Cir. 1982); Sledge v. J. P. Stevens, 585 F.2d 625, 634-36 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 981 (1979). See also Shoben, supra note. 35, at 239-44 (the role of statistics in proving intentional discrimination to challenge subjective interviews).
The text's suggestion about inferring disparate impact is reasonable for much the same reason
that courts allow a plaintiff to proceed on a similar basis in disparate treatment claims. In systemic
disparate treatment cases, plaintiffs sometimes cannot describe an accurate comparison population
because they lack data. Some courts accept the plaintiffs assumption that the qualifications, or lack
of them, are distributed equally among majority and minority group members. D. BALDUS & J.
COLE, supra note 12, at 194-97, 75-81 (Supp. 1984). In discretion cases, it also is reasonable to
assume that the unknown or unarticulated qualities that discretionary decisions reflect are distributed evenly among minority and majority group members. Id. at 24-26.
116. D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 12, at.24 n.27, 299.
117. Under statistical decision theory, one never can reject a hypothesis with certainty. Statisti-
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Exercises of discretion may have long-run impact on the basis of
race or gender for at least two reasons. First, the early Title VII cases
demonstrate how discretionary or subjective decisions are likely environments for acts of intentional discrimination.II 8 Given the lack of procedures or agreed-upon qualities, the opportunity for individual bias is
clear. Second, and more importantly for litigation under the disparate
impact theory, even when employers are unbiased in their employment
decisions, discretion can mask reliance on employee characteristics that
if known would call for justification.
The argument that discretion may have long-run racial or gender
effect is consistent with the order and allocation of proof in more typical
Title VII cases. In United States PostalService v. Aikens " 9 the Supreme
Court admonished the lower courts not to let the preliminary issues of
the plaintiff's prima facie case and the defendant's rebuttal overshadow
the ultimate factual question of whether the employer discriminated
against the plaintiff in violation of Title VII. Similarly, in Connecticut v.
Teal, the Court directed lower courts to look behind the end results of
the selection process at issue. 120 Here, the question is whether to scrutinize discretionary decisions and, if so, how. The problems of establishing
a prima facie case should be no greater in these cases than in other areas
of Title VII litigation.
Because discriminatory factors may influence or explain discretionary decisions and because the policy of Title VII is to eliminate artificial
barriers to employment opportunity, the lack of direct evidence in discretion cases should not immunize these cases from disparate impact chalcal theory permits one to reject very unlikely results with some low but specified probability of doing
so erroneously. Of course, rejecting the hypothesis that chance caused the disparity does not affirmatively prove its cause. Campbell, supra note 45, at 1304. See also Braun, Statistics and the Law:
Hypothesis Testing and Its Application to Title VII Cases, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 59 (1980). Although
tests of statistical significance are useful in assessing arguments that a given difference was a chance
result, their use is controversial when one knows the entire universe of decisions. D. BALDUS & J.
COLE, supra note 12, at 290, 316-17. Because tests of statistical significance assess the probability
that the results could stem from any random process, the tests are appropriate if one interprets their
results with care. Id. at 316.
118. See, e.g., Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007, 1012 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 940 (1981) (although subjective word-of-mouth hiring methods are suspect because they
tend to mask racial bias, courts may uphold them despite apparent favoritism of whites over blacks if
employers prove the methods are necessary to ensure that the safest and most competent workers are
hired). See also Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 549 (4th Cir. 1975).
119. 460 U.S. 711, 715-16 (1983) (the fact that Aikens involved a claim of intentional discrimination is not significant for the argument made in the text).
120. The Supreme Court rejected the employer's argument that the results of the entire process,
reflecting no adverse impact on blacks, precluded the plaintiffs from establishing a prima facie case
or, alternatively, provided a defense. 457 U.S. at 447 n.7. The Court said that a nondiscriminatory
bottom line did not excuse the employer from its duty to justify the selection criterion with an
adverse impact. The Court, however, did not discuss whether plaintiffs could use the bottom line
principle aggressively in disparate impact cases. For example, in discretion cases plaintiffs might
rely on the results of the entire process when direct proof of the source of the observed adverse
impact is unavailable. Any argument that Teal should apply to plaintiffs and thus require direct
proof of the causal connection between the challenged employment practice and the observed impact
is based on an uncritical appeal of mutuality and courts should reject the argument.
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lenges under Title VII. As Justice Frankfurter said in another context,
the law "nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination."' 2 1 This article now addresses the application of the disparate impact theory to discretionary decisionmaking and the differences in
discretion cases that require different solutions.
V.

APPLICATION OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY TO
DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS

The question remains how to analyze discretionary decisionmaking.
The answer lies in the policies underlying the disparate impact definition
of discrimination under Title VII and in whether discretionary decisionmaking exceeds the limits of the definition's theoretical underpinnings.
The most straightforward argument favoring the disparate impact
theory is that in Title VII Congress imposed a responsibility on employers to heed disproportionate outcomes for blacks and women, even when
equal treatment causes these outcomes. This duty is based on a recognition that historical, social, and structural barriers can impede the
achievement of minority group members.' 2 2
Other purposes of Title VII that support the disparate impact definition of discrimination are to acknowledge the present effects of past discrimination, to avoid the difficulties of proving impermissible motivation,
and to recognize that employers' uses of arbitrary or thoughtless employ12 3
ment criteria may be just as harmful as intentional discrimination.
The most extreme view of the disparate impact definition is that its function is to ensure equal achievement for minority group members. This
view recognizes a group right to a proportionate share of the economic
pie. 124
121. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939) (striking down Oklahoma's restrictive voterregistration statute under the fifteenth amendment).
122. Blumrosen, Strangersin Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination,71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972), supplies much of the theoretical justification. In
Abernathy, Title VI and the Constitution: A Regulatory Model for Defining "Discrimination",70
GEO. L.J. 1, 45-46 (1981), Professor Abernathy attributes the "popularization" of this concept to
Professor Brest's article, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. Cr. REV. 95, 110. See also Fiss, A Theory of-FairEmployment Laws,
38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235 (1971); Williams, Firingthe Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation
of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641, 668-703
(1981).
123. See, e.g., Belton, Discriminationand Affirmative Action: An Analysis of Competing Theories
of Equality and Weber, 59 N.C.L. REV. 531, 541 (1981); Brest, supra note 4, at 26-52; Chamallas,
supra note 4, at 334-44; Perry, supra note 4, at 555-61.
124. See, e.g., Bartholet, supra note 12, at 1026-27; Blumrosen, The 'Bottom Line'After Connecticut v. Teal, 8 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 572, 574-75 (1983); cf. Comment, The Business Necessity
Defense to Disparate-ImpactLiability Under Title VII, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 911, 921-25 (1979) (arguing that, because this is the function, courts should reject the theory or apply it in very limited
situations). See also Chamallas, supra note 4, at 365-70 (criticizing Court's rejection of the bottom
line principle in Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982), because disparate impact theory should
focus on group rights).
The corollary to Teal provides for an individual chance to that proportionate share. A contrary
view of the disparate impact theory-that it is merely a proxy for intentional discrimination--argues
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No doubt, the disparate impact definition of discrimination embodied in Title VII remains controversial because there is no consensus on
which of these ideas reflects the intent of Congress. Legislative history
supports each view." z5 Each idea can explain certain lines of cases and
various ideas combine in each of the Supreme Court's disparate impact
decisions. 126
What is clear is that the Supreme Court steadfastly defines discrimination to include employers' neutral policies not intended or consciously
used to discriminate, and to recognize an employer's right to promulgate
policies regardless of their incidental racial or gender effects if the policies truly are directed to central business or governmental concerns. By
defining disparate impact claims in terms of the employer's interests as
well as the effect of selection criteria on minority group members, the
Supreme Court's decisions suggest that Title VII requires a balancing of
those often incompatible interests, Although a balancing test always is
subject to misuse or misunderstanding, a statute addressing nondiscrimination in employment almost compels balancing because of the interdependent nature of the many legitimate interests involved. Stated broadly,
the ideal balance in disparate impact claims minimizes interference with
legitimate business prerogatives and maximizes the employment opportunities of minority group members. The need for and the nature of this
accommodation help to resolve some issues concerning the application of
the disparate impact theory to discretionary decisionmaking.
A.

Initial BarriersRejected

First, courts should not reject absolutely the disparate impact theory
as a challenge to discretionary decisions. The view that the theory is
inapplicable to discretionary decisions relies upon the fact that discretion
differs from the specific practices considered in the Supreme Court's disparate impact decisions. This view implies that all cases for which the
disparate impact theory is approoriate are alike. Fundamental factual
differences, however, distinguish even typical disparate impact cases and
the courts' failure to recognize these differences risks inadequate or superficial resolution to complex policy questions.1 27 Similarly, discretionthat only employment criteria obviously irrelevant to job performance are unlawful. Spaulding v.
University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 707, 708 (9th Cir. 1984).
125. For a review of the legislative history and early cases written before the Supreme Court's
decision in Griggs, see Developments in the Law-Employment Discriminationand Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1111-66 (1971). See also Belton, supra note 123, at
539-42; Blumrosen, supra note 122, at 66-75; Chamallas, supra note 4, at 325-29.
126. Cox, supra note 4, at 45-47. See also id. at 98-117; Chamallas, supra note 4, at 320-23, 33444; Furnish, supra note 4, at 421-40. Much depends on how one reads the cases in terms of the
defendant's burden of proof. Compare Comment, supra note 124, at 924-25, 933-34 (most legitimate
profit-maximizing practices should establish a business necessity defense) with Note, Business Necessity: JudicialDualism and the Searchfor Adequate Standards, 15 GA. L. REv. 376, 392-97, 404-15
(1981) (only practices that are essential to the safe and efficient operation of the business should
establish a business necessity defense).
127. See Lamber, Alternatives to Challenged Employee Selection Criteria: The Significance of
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ary acts differ. The argument that courts should not scrutinize some
discretionary decisions does not mean that all discretionary acts should
be immune from challenges under Title VII's disparate impact theory.
Moreover, the Supreme Court consistently has used terms such as "practices," "policies," and "barriers" in discussing and applying the disparate
impact theory.' 2 8 It never has differentiated between objective and
nonobjective barriers to employment opportunity. Only the curious footConstruction Company v. Waters implies that the Court
note in Furnco
29
might do so.'
In addition, the disparate impact theory and its analytical framework clearly are appropriate when plaintiffs allege intentional discrimination based upon gross statistical disparities which the employer rebuts
by identifying a specific practice to explain the disparity. As the court of
appeals concluded in Segar, a court should consider the facts then before
it in terms of the disparate impact theory.' 30 A contrary action would
exalt the form of the cause of action over the substance of the complaint.
Rejection of the disparate impact theory under facts similar to those
of Segar would make the "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact"
labels more important than the accommodation of interests required by
Title VII.1 3 1 An analysis that applies the disparate impact theory to
Nonstatistical Evidence in Disparate Impact Cases Under Title VII, 1985 Wisc. L. REV. 1, 42-59
(arguing that the significance of alternative employee selection criteria differs depending on the kind
of selection criterion challenged and the employer's reason for using it).
128. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 ("practices, procedures, or tests"); id. at 432 ("any given requirement"); Dothard, 433 U.S. at 328 ("artificial barrier to equal employment opportunity that Title VII
forbids"); Beazer, 440 U.S. at 584 ("an employment practice has the effect of denying . . . equal
access to employment opportunities"); Teal, 457 U.S. at 448 ("non-job-related barriers"). See also
Levitt & Mahoney, supra note 36, at 120 n. 147.
129. 438 U.S. 567, 575 n.7 (1978), discussed supra text accompanying notes 27-34.
To engage in such speculation one also must consider the Court's most recent opinion in Teal,
which can be read to say that the disparate impact theory is appropriate for challenging discretionary decisionmaking. In rejecting Connecticut's argument that a nondiscriminatory bottom line precluded plaintiffs from establishing a prima facie case, the Court relied in part on the legislative
history of the 1972 amendments to Title VII. The Court noted that the committee reports in both
houses relied on a report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights which concluded that
state and local government employees faced serious barriers to equal opportunity. 457 U.S. at 449
n.10 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. at 17 (1971)); S. Rep. No. 92-415, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. at 10 (1971); 118 CONG. REc. 1815-19 (1972)). One of the three barriers the Court cited
was promotions made on the basis of "criteria unrelated- to job performance and on discriminatory
supervisory ratings." Id. at 449 n.10 (citing U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FOR ALL THE PEOPLE. . . BY ALL THE PEOPLE-A REPORT ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN STATE AND LOCAL GovERNMENT EMPLOYMENT 119 (1969)).

130. 738 F.2d at 1270-72, discussed supra text accompanying notes 52-59.
131. The label or category the parties place on the action should not be the sole determinant of
the court's analysis. Although disparate treatment and disparate impact clearly serve different purposes and effectuate different conceptions of equality, some commentators have argued that the two
models do not differ in application. See Furnish, supra note 4, at 442 (distinction between disparate
treatment and disparate impact is not as great as the underlying theories suggest). Two improper
arguments assert the theories are the same. One assumes that disparate impact is merely a proxy for
intentional discrimination. The Supreme Court's most recent disparate impact decision, Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454 (1982), makes clear that disparate impact analysis is not simply a
proxy for intentional discrimination because no one suggested any intentional discrimination against
blacks. The second argument confuses adverse impact as evidence, which courts use to support an
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these facts also illustrates why the probability assumption for intentional
discrimination claims is not unduly harsh. As noted above, the Supreme
Court said that "absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that
nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force
more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the
population in the community from which employees are hired."'3 2 A
typical explanation is that a specific employment criterion excludes more
minority group members than majority group members. Although this
explanation may rebut the inference of intentional discrimination, the
identified criterion is not necessarily permissible if it is unrelated to job
performance or other legitimate business considerations. Moreover, the
application of the disparate impact theory in these factual situations
avoids judicial inefficiency. Once employees or applicants know that an
employer uses a specific criterion that explains an already-observed adverse impact, a subsequent lawsuit challenging it directly surely will
follow.
Finally, the disparate impact theory and its analytical framework
should apply even if the plaintiff does not have direct evidence to establish a causal connection between the employment practice challenged
and the observed adverse impact. The arguments advanced in Part IV
suggest that the plaintiff's inability to present direct evidence of causation
should not immunize discretionary decisions from disparate impact challenges. The question at the preliminary stage of litigation is whether the
plaintiff has established meaningful adverse impact. The keys to deciding
this question are the strength of the plaintiff's statistical evidence and the
likelihood that an apparent adverse impact reflects the true picture. By
focusing on the plaintiff's failure to challenge an identifiable rule, courts
confuse the form of the evidence with its purpose.
B.

DistinguishingAmong Claims of Discretion

In other cases, the application of the disparate impact theory and
the appropriate balance of interests is not as easy to determine. Exercises
of discretion can account for the best and the worst employment decisions. Some of the world's greatest decisions cannot be rationalized yet
inference of intentional discrimination in disparate treatment cases, with adverse impact as a theory
of liability. For an illustration, see Teal, 457 U.S. at 458-59 & n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting). The one
valid reason to conclude that the theories are, if not the same, at least similar is Justice Stevens' point
in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 252-56 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring), in which the Court
held that evidence of disproportionate failure rates alone did not establish a prima facie case of
discrimination under the Constitution. Justice Stevens points out that "the line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite as critical, as
the reader of [Washington v. Davis] might assume." Id. at 254. When the distinction would be
helpful in resolving hard cases, it often is difficult to distinguish impact as evidence and impact as a
separate theory. An equally good reason exists to maintain the differences: The disparate treatment
theory is premised on fault; the disparate impact theory seeks changes in the structure of the workplace as a way to achieve equal employment opportunity.
132. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977) (emphasis added). See supra
note 102.
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some of the world's greatest hunches have been disastrous. In contrast,
decisions based on objective factors often are compromises or, worse, are
simply mediocre. Thus, it would be a mistake for employers to use only
objective employment criteria and a bigger mistake to read Title VII to
require that they do so.'
Similarly, courts should not interpret Title
VII to encourage employers to claim the protective coloration of subjective factors.
An accommodation of interests under Title VII's disparate impact
theory must reflect the different circumstances in which employers exercise discretion. Consider the employer who plays a hunch with the
knowledge that he will win big in the marketplace if he is right and lose
big if he is wrong. He plays a hunch because neither he nor anyone else
knows what factors or characteristics predict success or how important a
particular characteristic is. This lack of knowledge suggests that courts
will gain little from scrutinizing this employer's judgment. Now, consider the employer who has nothing to lose if she is wrong (or to gain if
right) but who nonetheless makes subjective decisions to protect her decision-making process from judicial scrutiny. Piercing the discretionary
veil is appropriate but distinguishing such an employer from an employer
with a legitimate claim to discretion is another matter. The four factors
which follow are relevant to making such distinctions and thereby suggest the appropriate accommodation under Title VII's disparate impact
theory.
1.

Public v. Private

1 34
One factor is the difference between public and private employers.
When Congress amended Title VII in 1972 to extend its protections to
public-sector employees, 135 courts and litigants faced the question of
what standard to apply. The prevailing view is that public and private
employers are subject to the same standards under Title VII., 36 The ab-

133. Cf United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 453 (5th Cir. 1971) (the Act
imposes on employers an affirmative duty to devise and implement objective criteria for choosing
among applicants for promotion or transfer); Russell v. American Tobacco Co., 374 F. Supp. 286,
289 (M.D.N.C. 1973) aff'd, 528 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975) (the lack of objective guidelines and written
criteria are some indicia of discrimination); Cox, supra note 4, at 112 n.314 ("[a] finding of liability
under the [disparate] impact model implies an obligation to substitute objective criteria").
134. For a general discussion of the public/private distinction, see A Symposium: The Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289-1608 (1982). Although the weight once accorded
the distinction is lessening, some distinct treatment along public/private lines seems destined to
continue as long as other features of law and government remain. See Stone, Corporate Vices and
CorporateVirtues: Do Public/PrivateDistinctionsMatter?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1441, 1506-09 (1982).
The text offers "market forces" as a principle to consider in resolving one narrow class of cases.
135. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 2, 11, 86 Stat.
103, 111 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 20(0e-2000e-17 (1982)). These amendments exempted elected
state officials and their personal or policy-making appointees (§ 2000e(O) and established separate
procedural requirements for complaints involving federal employment (§ 2000e-16).
136. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331 n.14 (Congress expressly indicated the intent that courts apply
the same Title VII principles to governmental and private employers alike); Jacobs, A Constitutional
Route to Discriminatory Impact Statutory Liabilityfor State and Local Government Employers." All
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sence of market forces in the public sector suggests, however, that discretionary acts by public employers are not entitled to the same deference
that private employers enjoy.
States continually, but so far unsuccessfully, have argued for a more
deferential standard of review. They base their argument on federalism
and a limited view of congressional power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Specifically, states have argued that the disparate
impact theory should not apply to them because it prohibits discrimination beyond the scope of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause.1 3 7 Alternatively, states argue that the federal courts should be
more deferential in evaluating both state employment practices and the
1 38
justifications for those practices if they have an adverse impact.
Although the Supreme Court has applied the disparate impact theory in
three cases involving public employer defendants, it has declined to rule
directly on the states' challenges. 139 In Dothard, however, the Court
noted that Congress intended the same Title VII principles to apply to
governmental and private employers alike. 1"0
In contrast to both the states' arguments and the prevailing view,
public employers should be held to a higher standard when they exercise
discretion. The federalism argument is not insignificant,' 41 but the Constitution already regulates public employers in various facets of their employment operations. These restraints on permissible behavior are
inapplicable to employers in the private sector.' 4 2 Accordingly, private
Roads Lead to Rome, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 301, 314-17, 342-47 (1980); Friedman, The Burger Court and
the Prima Facie Case in Employment DiscriminationLitigation: A Critique,65 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
25-30 (1979).
137. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 323 n.1; Beazer, 440 U.S. at 583 n.23, 584 n.25; Jacobs, supra note
136, at 321-23. See also Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 306 n.12 (1977), in
which the defendant questioned Congress' "authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
to prohibit by Title VII. . .employment practices of an agency of a state government in the absence
of proof that the agency purposefully discriminated against applicants on the basis of race." Hazelwood, however, did not present the issue because the plaintiff's theory was intentional discrimination.
138. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331 n.14. States also have challenged Title VII backpay and attorneys' fees awards against state employers under the eleventh amendment, which bars certain private
suits against states in federal court. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 1972
amendments in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). Treating the 1972 amendments as an
exercise of congressional power under section five of the fourteenth amendment, the Court held that
Congress could abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity and authorize private Title VII
suits against state employers. Although the Court's interpretation of the eleventh amendment continues to evolve, the conclusion in Bitzer retains vitality. See generally Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The
Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984).
139. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 323 n.1; Beazer, 440 U.S. at 584 n.25. There is no evidence that the
defendants raised the issue in the third case, Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
140. 433 U.S. at 331 n.14.
141. The commerce clause is an adequate constitutional basis for imposing the more rigorous
Title VII standards on the states, especially in light of the Court's recent overruling of National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which had limited congressional authority to regulate
integral governmental functions. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1007
(1985). Cf Maltz, supra note 12, at 791 n.76 (stringent application of the disparate impact theory to
public employers would significantly infringe deeply rooted values associated with federalism).
142. This is simply what "state action" means. See, e.g., Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14
STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961) (discussion of the fourteenth amendment's state action requirement in the
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employers enjoy greater discretion to structure their policies and to decide which interests to advance in the workplace.' 43
The desire of Congress for like treatment of public and private employers is not frustrated by taking real differences into account in particular situations. Indeed, balancing interests under the disparate impact
theory requires such distinctions. For example, without adopting a different standard of review under Title VII, a court should recognize that a
public employer's interests extend beyond profit-maximizing motives to
intangible concerns such as promoting a sense of political community.
In doing so, a court could find permissible a justification that it might not
allow in the private sector." Similarly, in reviewing challenges to discretionary decisionmaking, courts should consider the absence of market
forces which, in the private sector, minimize the risks of poor judgment.
If private sector employers often misplay hunches, their businesses soon
will end.' 45 If a public employer often misplays hunches, no one may
context of racial discrimination). The state action requirement is not without its own philosophical
controversies. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1147-74 (1978); Brest, State Action
and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296 (1982);
Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL.
L. REV. 208 (1957).
143. See Maltz, supra note 12, at 789-92. Indeed, one might argue that discrimination by the
state is more offensive than discrimination by private employers. But in Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976), holding that evidence of disproportionate failure rates alone did not establish a
prima facie case of discrimination under the Constitution, the Court rejected the argument that
"equal protection" means the government has a responsibility to eliminate racially disproportionate
outcomes that occur under equal treatment. For detailed discussion and criticism of the intent requirement, see Binion, "Intent" and Equal Protection: A Reconsideration, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 397;
Brest, supra note 4; Perry, supra note 4; Note, DiscriminatoryPurpose and DisproportionateImpact:
An Assessment After Feeney, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1376 (1979).
The extent to which Congress can impose more stringent standards on states raises the scope of
congressional power under section five of the fourteenth amendment, a controversial subject.
Clearly Congress can go beyond section one of the fourteenth amendment. See generally Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-51 (1966), in which the Court held that Congress' power under
section five to enact legislation is not limited to situations where state law has been adjudged to
violate the provisions of section one of the fourteenth amendment. Instead, section five is a positive
grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and
what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. How much more
power Congress has under this section is unclear. For example, in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970), the Court held that Congress could enfranchise 18- to 21 -year-olds in national elections (four
justices concluding that section five gave Congress the power to do so) but Congress could not
interfere, under section five of the fourteenth amendment, with the age for voters set by the states for
state and local elections. The Court also reaffirmed Congress' authority under section two of the
fifteenth amendment to ban literacy tests even though the Court previously had upheld a literacy
requirement against a claim that it was invalid under the fifteenth amendment. Id. at 231-36 (citing
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding a more limited statute) and Lassiter
v. Northhampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (literacy test does not violate fifteenth amendment)). In Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 16 n. 12 (1981), the Court avoided the
issue of whether Congress had the power under section five to create the right to treatment in the
least restrictive setting for institutionalized mentally retarded individuals by concluding that the
statute created no rights whatsoever.
144. Lamber, supra note 127, at 40 n.154.
145. This statement is true unless the market is biased. For a general discussion of economic
theory and discrimination, see G. BECKER, ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971); Arrow,
The Theory of Discrimination,in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS (0. Ashenfelter & A. Rees
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notice.
2. De Facto Rules and Protective Hierarchies
A second factor that determines the applicability of the disparate
impact theory to discretion cases is the decision-making process of a particular business. Although an infinite variety of decision-making structures exist, one may identify decisions made within a hierarchy of
authority with stated principles to guide the employer's exercise of discretion. Courts and commentators often suggest such levels of review
and guidelines to control discretion in order to save subjective systems,
but decisions that employers reach within a "bureaucratic" environment
are fatally flawed and courts should give them less deference.146
This process is different from the case of an employer who plays a
hunch for high stakes in two ways. First, the process often becomes rulebound. Decisionmakers lose sight of the discretionary nature of their
decisions and in their minds play no hunch or exercise no discretion.
Second, the hierarchy of authority insulates the various decisionmakers.
Individual decisionmakers do not feel (or in fact are not) responsible for
their decisions. Thus, they lose sight of the high stakes at risk with a
discretionary decision.14 7
Consider the promotion process from associate professor to professor at a major university. 4 ' Promotion, in contrast to tenure, recognizes
eds. 1973); Rothschild & Werden, Title VII and the Use of Employment Tests: An Illustrationof the
Limits of the JudicialProcess, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 269-72 (1982).
146. Although bureaucracy suggests governments, private employers, especially not-for-profit
institutions or regulated industries, can operate within similar environments, the absence of a financial bottom line may encourage the structured decisionmaking as a substitute for market forces. For
examples of cases in which courts have suggested specific guidelines to control discretion, advertisements of job openings, and addition of decisionmakers and layers of review to cure unlawful discretionary systems, see Hamilton v. General Motors Corp., 606 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 907 (1980); Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039
(1980); Frink v. United States Navy, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 67, 70-71 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Miller v. Continental Can Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1585, 1602-03 (S.D. Ga. 1976). Cf.
Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1972) (no safeguards in procedures
designed to avert discriminatory practices as factor to consider in finding Title VII violation). Commentators echo this advice. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 201-05; Stacy, supra note
12, at 750-52; Waintroob, supra note 12, at 51-56, 119. Cf Bartholet, supra note 12, at 1006-08
(procedural reforms may be the first step but some reforms also may interfere with effective
decisionmaking).
147. These two consequences are intertwined. Rule-applying also insulates the decisionmaker
because it is easier than making a discretionary judgment. Layers of authority obscure the discretionary nature of the decision because the internal review suggests that each decisionmaker can
explain a decision and that others can substantively review the decision.
148. Although the university promotion process may appear idiosyncratic, it is not. Promotion
often means a new or different job, for example, moving from assembly line worker to foreman; some
promotions, however, simply reward past performance by increased pay or status without different
job responsibilities. In the civil service, for example, promotion from a GS- 1 to GS-12 means a
difference in pay and some increased responsibility, but the essence of the job usually stays the same.
Similarly, in upper level management, a manager's promotion may mean that she is now a corporate
officer and has more independence but continues to do the same job. The same is true in universities
where a full professor's daily life may be the same as an assistant professor's but he has more freedom, independence, or authority. Even if university promotion is idiosyncratic, the application of
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past achievement and signifies confidence that the individual is capable of
greater responsibilities and accomplishment. The university assesses the
individual in terms of teaching, research, and service. It usually promotes an individual when he or she has demonstrated a level of competence or distinction appropriate to the proposed rank in one area of
endeavor; failure to promote may be based on unsatisfactory performance in other areas. When teaching is the primary criterion for promotion, the candidate must demonstrate an extraordinary ability to
stimulate in students a genuine desire for scholarly work and to direct
the research of advanced students. If research is the primary criterion,
the candidate must show a continued growth in scholarship and a national reputation as a first-class productive scholar.149
Whether an individual has achieved such distinction necessarily involves a discretionary judgment. The standards cannot be measured easily by objective criteria. Moreover, the pool of associate professors
considered for promotion may come from many different disciplines.
The process is competitive in a sense, but there may be no fixed number
of promotions available.
Over the years universities have adopted various procedural reforms
to expose the process to internal review, including the development of
guidelines to control the discretion of individuals and the addition of layers of decisionmaking and internal appeals. 5 ' The decision-making process may include a department committee, the department faculty, the
department chairperson, a faculty committee at the school level, the dean
of the school, another committee at the university level, and finally one
or two academic administrators leading to a recommendation to the
Title VII to academic institutions has received sufficient attention in the literature and the courts to
warrant the example. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 12; Divine, Women in the Academy: Sex Discrimination in University Faculty Hiring and Promotion, 5 J.L. & EDUC. 429 (1976); Vladeck &
Young, Sex Discrimination in Higher Education: It's Not Academic, 4 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 59
(1978); Wagner, Tenure and Promotion in Higher Education in Light of Washington v. Davis, 24
WAYNE L. REV. 95 (1977).
149. Although the articulation of the standard may vary among institutions, the standard given
in the text is commonplace. See, e.g., Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 604 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980); Cooper, supra note 12, at 981 n.29; Divine, supra note 148, at
436-39 (in the context of hiring); Yurko, Judicial Recognition of Academic Collective Interests: A
New Approach to Faculty Title VII Litigation, 60 B.U.L. REV. 473, 475-82 (1980).
150. Universities adopted most procedures in the context of nonreappointment, tenure, or dismissal but the procedures may apply to promotions as well. See, e.g., Statement on Procedural
Standards in Faculty Dismissal Proceedings, 54 AAUP BULL. 439 (1968); Statement on Procedural
Standardsin the Renewal or Nonrenewal of Faculty Appointments, 57 AAUP BULL. 206 (1971); 1982
Recommended InstitutionalRegulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure, 69 ACADEME: BULL.
OF THE AAUP 15a (Jan.-Feb. 1983); Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities, 63
AAUP BULL. 32 (1977) (formulated and approved by the American Association of University
Professors [AAUP], American Council on Education [ACE], and the Association of Governing
Boards of Universities and Colleges). See also Ind. Code § 5-14-3-4(b)(8) (Supp. 1984) (all personnel
file information shall be made available to the affected employee). For a more general discussion of
procedural reforms within higher education, see Finkin, Regulation by Agreement: The Case of Private Higher Education, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1119 (1980); Malin & Ladenson, University Faculty Members' Right to Dissent: Toward a Unified Theory of Contractual and ConstitutionalProtection, 16
U.C.D. L. REV. 933 (1983).
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board of trustees or regents. Individual units may supplement general
university standards, both in substance and in procedures, taking into
account differences in disciplines and missions.
In addition, objective measures of "excellence" are commonplace,
despite the subjective nature of promotions decisions. Perhaps an associate professor must be in rank for four years, even though the achievement on which promotion is based may happen in two years. A
professor must publish three books to establish a national reputation as a
first-class scholar, even though the first book won a national prize. Four
letters of outside support are insufficient to establish a national reputation, even if each letter proclaims the excellent reputation.
Objective measures and internal review of decisions have their advantages. Objective measures can aptly describe individual cases. Quantifiable standards can reduce uncertainty, thereby lessening tension for
individual faculty members. By specifying factors that define excellence
and reviewing lower-level decisions, universities can control individual
exercises of discretion and help to eliminate decisions based only on personalities or politics. Although the transformation of a discretionary
process into an objective one within a hierarchy of authority thus may
seem more just, this sense of fairness comes at a price.
The virtue of discretionary decisionmaking can be realized only if
the decisionmaker knowingly exercises discretion. Appellate review generally follows the same principle: a reviewing court will remand a lower
court's decision if the lower court erroneously thought it was bound by a
rule but in fact should have exercised discretion.' 5 ' Decisions based on
objective standards within a hierarchy of authority are easier than exercising discretion; thus decisionmakers may not pay sufficient attention to
what is or should be a subjective judgment. The standards combine with
the multi-level decision process to insulate the individual decisionmaker,
who risks little in making a decision. Application of the disparate impact
theory under these circumstances does not intrude on the decision-making process. Courts have little reason to defer to a discretionary decision
that the individual decisionmakers, who have nothing to lose, do not take
seriously. Moreover, courts have no reason to defer to what could be a
discretionary decision if the institution has not in fact exercised any
discretion.
3. Measurement Bias
A third consideration which determines the applicability of the disparate impact theory to discretionary decisions is the risk of bias in the
151. See Compton v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 425 F.2d 1130, 1133 (2d Cir. 1970) (defendant argued that trial court erroneously thought it was powerless to weigh evidence on motion for a
new trial but court of appeals held that the lower court made clear its awareness of the full extent of
its discretionary power); Rosenberg, JudicialDiscretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22
SYR. L. REV. 635, 666 (1971) (when a trial judge is called upon to exercise discretion he is bound to
do so and may not abdicate his duty by pretending his hands are tied by a rule of law).
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measurement or definition of general standards. This risk may arise in
two ways. First, an employer determines wages or promotions on a discretionary or subjective basis but the plaintiff alleges that certain factors
are determinative. For example, an employer may say that a salary is
negotiable depending on education and experience but the plaintiff shows
that "past salary" is the determinative factor. Second, the employer acknowledges that certain factors play a determinative role in setting salaries or obtaining promotions but measures these factors subjectively. The
employer may base salaries on effort or responsibility but the plaintiff
shows that the employer's expectations about these factors reflect
predominantly male jobs.I5 2
A court's application of the disparate impact theory to these situations should be straightforward. Plaintiffs can identify a neutral rule that
is related causally to the observed adverse impact. The fact that the employer does not state the operative factors in objective terms or that the
employer exercises unbiased discretion should not obscure the essential
elements of the disparate impact theory.
An example from the comparable worth debate illustrates the point.
Proponents of comparable worth assert that employers pay women engaged in historically female work artificially depressed wages relative to
what those wages would be if white males performed the jobs. Comparable worth proponents contend that employers undervalue the jobs because the work has been and continues to be done primarily by women.
They argue that different and dissimilar jobs should command the same
wages if the jobs are of equivalent worth to the employer, according to
various neutral definitions.' 5 3 Opponents of comparable worth maintain
that individual choice segregates occupations and that employers assign
wages according to the marketplace. Moreover, opponents argue that
the comparable value of dissimilar jobs is indeterminant. The comparison is, in their view, like comparing the work of poets and plumbers.' 54
Job evaluation systems in some form nearly always are part of this
debate. These systems can be useful to identify wage discrimination as
152. This factor follows from the second. In both situations the employer asserts discretion as
the basis of its decision but the plaintiff alleges that certain policies or rules are determinative. The
second factor concerns the transformation of a discretionary process into a rule-bound process as
well as the protection of individual decisonmakers by the levels of review. Here, the concern is the
nature of the standards themselves.
153. See, e.g., Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 399 (1979); Gasaway, Comparable Worth: A Post-Gunther
Overview, 69 GEO. L.J. 1123 (1981); Newman & Vonhof, "Separate But Equal"-JobSegregation
and Pay Equity in the Wake of Gunther, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 269; Note, Equal Pay, Comparable
Worth, and Job Evaluation, 90 YALE L.J. 657 (1981).
154. Louisville Courier Journal, Jan. 22, 1984, § 1, at 1, col. 1, col. 4 ("How do you compare
the poet and the plumber?" asked one Justice Department attorney.). See also Cox, Equal Work
Comparable Worth and Disparate Treatment: An Argument for Narrowly Construing County of
Washington v. Gunther, 22 DuQ. L. REV. 65 (1983); Livernash, An Overview, in COMPARABLE
WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES (E. Livernash ed. 1980); Comment, Comparable Worth and
Title VII: The Case Against DisparateImpact Analysis, 16 PAC. L.J. 833 (1985).
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well as to define a remedy. The several kinds of systems share one basic
feature. In each job evaluation system, analysts determine the "compensable factors" in the wage system such as effort, skill, and
responsibility. 55
The problem with these systems, however, is their potential sex bias
because the compensable factors may be oriented toward predominantly
male jobs. For example, analysts may measure effort in terms of strength
rather than fatigue so that predominantly male blue-collar jobs score
higher than predominantly female clerical jobs even if the male and female jobs are equally fatiguing for the average worker. A manual skills
factor may stress the ability to handle tools rather than manual dexterity,
effectively down-grading fine assembly work that women usually perform. Analysts may define responsibility in terms of supervision or
budgetary control, rather than in terms of organizational ability.' 56 The
subjective nature of job analysis and evaluation is another source of potential bias. Evaluators may underestimate what women do and overestimate the importance of what men do.157
Similarly, potential bias exists when an employer defines the worth
of jobs or the standard for promotions in male terms. An employer
clearly has discretion to determine the compensable factors in a wage or
promotion system; the application of these standards also may properly
involve discretion. These discretionary judgments, however, may touch
characteristics that relate to race or gender. If the employer states these
characteristics in objective terms, the disparate impact theory surely applies. Once the plaintiff identifies the characteristics, the court should
allow the plaintiff to challenge the choice of factors and their measure1 58
ment under the disparate impact theory.
4. Discretion in the Job
A fourth factor courts should weigh in determining whether the disparate impact theory applies to discretionary decisionmaking is the nature of the job. Some commentators and courts have suggested that
subjective decisions are more appropriate for upper level jobs than for
lower level jobs. 59 Although they acknowledge the difficulty of drawing
155.

D. TREIMAN, JOB EVALUATION: AN ANALYTIC REVIEW 1-7 (1979) (National Research

Council/National Academy of Sciences, Interim Report to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission). See also Vieira, Comparable Worth and the Gunther Case: The New Drivefor Equal
Pay, 18 U.C.D. L. REV. 449, 468-71, 477-81 (1985) (discussing uses of job evaluation systems in
comparable worth cases); Note, supra note 153, at 674-76 (advocating job evaluation systems for
comparable worth cases).
156. D. TREIMAN, supra note 155, at 32-33.
157. Id. at 43-46.
158. The issue is similar to the one in Segar, discussed supra text accompanying notes 52-59.
The difference is that in Segar the plaintiff alleged intentional discrimination which the defendant
attempted to rebut with a nondiscriminatory explanation which in turn raised the disparate impact
issue. Here, the plaintiff alleges disparate impact, arguing that the employer has not discriminated
intentionally but rather has used a neutral factor with an adverse impact on blacks or women.
159. See supra note 37.
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such a line, these discussions rely on the socioeconomic status of the
job.

16 0

In contrast, the distinction advanced here is whether the job itself
involves the exercise of considerable discretion. 16 t As with the other factors suggested above, the difference between this view and the more typical one is a matter of degree and perception. Upper level employees are
likely to enjoy discretion as part of their jobs while lower level employees
are not. The relationship, however, is not absolute nor is the distinction
sufficiently accurate. For example, police officers, especially those on the
patrol beat, may have low socioeconomic status by some measures but
society vests them with considerable discretion by authorizing them to
carry and use firearms.
An employer's use of discretion in selecting an employee who will
exercise discretion is legitimate. This view is supported by the Supreme
Court's recent decisions on aliens and the restrictions that states may
impose on their employment.
Starting from the general proposition that a court may sustain a
state law that discriminates on the basis of alienage only when the law
can withstand strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court has developed the
"political function" exception. This exception applies to laws that exclude aliens from positions intimately related to the process of democratic self-government. The rationale behind the political function
exception is that some public positions are so closely connected with the
formulation and implementation of self-government that the states may
reasonably exclude from those positions persons outside the political
community, including persons who
have not become part of the process
162
of democratic self-determination.
The Court has held that states can require police officers, public
school teachers, and probation officers to be citizens. 163 They cannot,
however, require lawyers, civil engineers, or notaries public to be citi160.

Bartholet, supra note 12, at 948 n.2, uses upper level jobs to include "middle and upper

management jobs, professional positions, and other jobs requiring advanced educational degrees."
Lower level jobs include "blue collar jobs, including supervisory jobs and highly skilled craft jobs,"

and "white collar jobs with limited status and power."
Cooper, supra note 12, at 982, says that courts scrupulously scrutinize lower-level criteria. The
ease with which employers escape liability suggests, however, that the scrutiny is not so close. See
Note, supra note 126, at 404.
161. Such jobs also are likely to have hard-to-define responsibilities. If pressed, however, the
employer usually can describe good job performance. More difficult problems include articulating

the qualities required to do a good job and identifying those individuals who possess the elusive
qualities.
162. They are not part of the process because they do not have the right to vote. See Cabell v.
Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1982).
163. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297-300 (1978) (state may require police officers to be
citizens because they have authority to exercise an almost infinite variety of discretionary powers);
Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 78-81 (1979) (public school teachers must be citizens because they

possess a high degree of responsibility and discretion in the fulfillment of basic governmental obligations); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (probation officers must be citizens because they
routinely exercise discretionary power that places them in direct authority over other individuals).
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zens.16 The difference, according to the Court, is whether "the officeholder would necessarily exercise broad discretionary power over the
formulation or execution of public policies importantly affecting the citizen population-power of the sort that a self-governing community
could properly entrust only to full-fledged members of that
community."165
The Court's decisions about aliens and its political function exception provide a useful way to consider how the nature of the job affects
discretionary decisions. Employees who themselves exercise discretion
occupy a place in the employer's business similar to those employees who
fit within the political function exception. Instead of democratic selfgovernment, the essential interest of the employer is the ability to control
and direct its business. The choice of those who exercise the employer's
discretion is central and fundamental to this aspect of an employer's
autonomy. 166
If discretion is legitimate in the selection of employees who have
discretion, the question remains whether courts should scrutinize this exercise in some way. In the alien cases, for example, the Court does not
apply the political function exception if it concludes that the statute is
over- or underinclusive in its restrictions on aliens.167 Similarly, a court
should scrutinize the employer's claim that particular employees have
discretion as well as the scope and magnitude of the claimed discretion.
The fundamental nature of these positions suggests that few employees
would fall within that sphere. 161 If a court concludes that discretion is
appropriate in selecting the employee, however, then any further scrutiny
is troubling. The problem is that no one knows exactly what characteristics make for success or how important a particular characteristic is.
Given the general lack of knowledge in this situation, courts have little
reason to override an employer's hunch in a particular case.
This conclusion is disturbing for the very reason that discretion is
appropriate. Social science literature suggests that in exercising discre164. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (lawyers); Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S.
572 (1976) (civil engineers); Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984) (notaries).
165. Bernal, 467 U.S. at 224. The political function exception properly applies to positions that
are "invested with policy-making responsibility or broad discretion in the execution of public policy
that requires the routine exercise of authority over individuals." Id. at 226.
166. Courts should not simply transpose these decisions about aliens on Title VII cases.
Although the Court has put several specific positions on either side of the political function line, see
supra notes 163-64, lower courts should not automatically adopt these specific distinctions for Title
VII cases, even though the employee's discretion was part of the Court's decision in each case.
Democratic self-government is not the key to Title VII disputes; the appropriate balance between
employer's prerogatives and employees' interests in equal employment is.
167. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. at 440 (first part of two-part test examines the specificity
of the classification: a classification that is substantially over- or underinclusive tends to undercut
the governmental claim that the classification serves legitimate political ends). See also Bernal, 467
U.S. at 221.
168. Courts also narrowly construe the political function exception, Bernal, 467 U.S. at 222 n.7.
See also Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 11 (1976).
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tion employers tend to choose individuals most like themselves.1 69 Because most employers choosing employees with discretion are white
males, the risk is that employers will prefer white males over women and
other minority group members.
This preference stems from the notion that women and minority
group members are too unpredictable in the way they would exercise
discretion.' 7 ° This notion is not universally shared and most people do
not define themselves solely in terms of race or gender. Other characteristics such as work habits, education, or background may be more important to this discretionary judgment. Nonetheless, no one should
underestimate the nature of the risk.
These four factors illustrate the value and harm of discretionary decisions. Drawn from the different circumstances in which employers exercise discretion, these factors reflect the need for courts to evaluate the
employer's sincerity in claiming discretion. The application of the disparate impact theory to discretionary decisionmaking is appropriate and
does not exceed the definition's theoretical underpinnings. Some cases
vary only slightly from the classic disparate impact model, such as when
the plaintiff shows bias in the employer's measurement of discretionary
standards. In other cases the disparate impact theory tests the legitimacy
of claimed discretion.
C. Defendant's Burden of Proof
If the disparate impact theory applies to discretionary decisionmaking, the remaining question concerns the defendant's burden of proof.
Some commentators merely assert that courts should evaluate acts of discretion by the same standard as classic disparate impact cases but without explaining how the standard would apply.' 7 ' Other commentators
argue that it is impossible to justify discretionary decisions and conclude
that the disparate impact theory therefore is inappropriate.' 7 2 Although
courts may find it difficult to apply the typical defense burden to discretion cases, the burden of proof should be the same in both kinds of
169. R. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 47-68 (1977).
170. Id. at 54-55.
171. See, e.g., Stacy, supra note 12, at 748 ("both test and other selection techniques require the
same degree of validation for demonstrating job-relatedness"); Waintroob, supra note 12, at 117-18
(business necessity defense may be of little help to employers whose subjective practices have a
discriminatory impact). But see Tepker, supra note 13, at 1085-87 (employer should present substantial evidence that the standards are designed to achieve an important educational objective and
should be required to demonstrate with substantial evidence a policy's effectiveness and validity that
the employer, acting in good faith, believed).
172. See, e.g., B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 1289 (the three-stage adverse impact
model is inapplicable to "excessive subjectivity" case because plaintiffs do not challenge a specific
employment criteria which the employer can, in turn, establish is job-related); Cooper, supra note 12,
at 992 (courts are afraid to impose validation requirements because empirical justification eludes
subjective standards); Maltz, supra note 12, at 789-92 (validation imposes unnecessary and unrealistic burdens on employer autonomy).
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cases. 173
Employers attack disparate impact claims in two ways. First, as
discussed in Part IV, the employer may deny that a practice has a meaningful adverse impact on the minority group in question by challenging
the accuracy or significance of the plaintiff's statistical evidence. Second,
the employer may concede the disparity but seek to justify the use of the
employment practice. In the latter situation, an employer claims either
"job-relatedness" or "business necessity." An employer makes a job-relatedness argument when she says, for example, that performance on a
written test predicts performance on a particular job. An employer
makes a business necessity argument when he justifies an employment
practice with reasons unrelated to job performance. For example, a city
might argue that its residency rule advances a sense of political community. Thus, the nature of an acceptable justification depends on the kind
of practice challenged and the employer's reasons for using that practice.
Although the specific arguments change, in each case the employer has
that the employment practice
the burden of persuasion and must show
1 74
interest.
business
important
an
furthers
The defendant's burden of proof also varies in discretion cases.
Some discretion cases merely involve traditional application of the disparate impact theory. For example, when a plaintiff shows that an employer is not making a discretionary decision, although purporting to do
so, the employer must justify the criteria actually used. 1 75 Similarly, if
the plaintiff shows that certain characteristics, although stated in subjective terms, have an adverse impact, then the employer must justify their
use. 176 In these cases the employer may argue either job-relatedness or
depending on the actual practice and the employer's
business necessity
77
rationale.'
173. For a general discussion of the defendant's burden of proof in typical disparate impact
cases, a burden which is not uncontroversial, see Furnish, supra note 4, at 425-40; Lamber, supra
note 127, at 34-41; Comment, supra note 124; Note, supra note 126, at 392-97, 404-15.
174. Courts and litigants commonly use the terms "job-relatedness" and "business necessity,"
which are useful ways to present and to analyze evidence. Nevertheless, one should not reify the
difference. See Lamber, supra note 127, at 38 n.152. In choosing an employee who will exercise
discretion, for example, the employer could say that the need to trust in those discretionary judgments is related to job performance. The employer also could argue that the need for an employee
whose discretionary judgments are trustworthy is a business necessity. The statement in the text
presents the issue more generally: is the practice substantially related to an important business interest? The first part tests the fit between the challenged practice and the employer's interest; the
second part tests the importance of the employer's goal.
175. This situation would be a likely outcome with de facto rules and protective hierarchies
(factor two), supra text accompanying notes 146-51.
176. This situation would be a likely outcome with the third factor, measurement bias, supra
text accompanying notes 152-58. See also Shoben, supra note 35, at 223-24, discussing how litigants
can break down some interviews and treat them like typical disparate impact cases.
177. Consider, for example, an employer with discretion to determine the compensable factors
in a wage system and to apply those standards. The employer may compensate "effort" more than
education and define effort in terms of strength. If a plaintiff shows this definition has an adverse
impact on women, the employer must justify the principle of defining effort by strength. The employer would argue job-relatedness or business necessity depending on whether this reward structure
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DISCRETIONARY DECISIONMAKING

In most cases, however, the employer will not attempt to justify a
discretionary decision with a job-relatedness argument. If an employer is
unsure what characteristics predict success or how important a particular characteristic is, the employer is unlikely to show the necessary con17 8
nection between those unarticulated qualities and job performance.
The employer is more likely to attempt to justify using discretion in business necessity terms. Consider the case for the greatest deference: the
employer who plays a hunch for high stakes. The nature of the hunch
and the lack of consensus about the relevant characteristics suggest only
one question-is discretion appropriate?
Supreme Court decisions involving employment practices unrelated
to job performance suggest some limit on the kinds of reasons that can
justify such practices with an adverse impact. 79 Properly understood,
the business necessity standard accommodates the conflicting interests of
the employer and employee. The employer must demonstrate that discretion serves legitimate business needs. This standard requires the employer to prove more than that discretion is common or superficially
rational; the employer must show the need for and importance of discretion.' 8 0 The plaintiff can challenge the employer's claim in two ways,
drawing on the four factors discussed above. First, the plaintiff can argue that discretion is not substantially related to the employer's goals.
For example, the plaintiff may show that discretion does not accomplish
what the employer intends by demonstrating that the employer would
better further its purpose in other ways. Second, the plaintiff can argue
that discretion is not sufficiently important to the employer because of
the nature of the job, the kind of employer, or the realities of the deciencourages employees to do better work or whether it rewards strength for other business reasons,
such as ability to recruit. In either case, the essential question is the importance of measuring the
existence of an admittedly proper trait (effort) in a certain way (strength). This question is the
second part of the justification test, see supra note 174.
178. The failure to establish a connection is not because such a connection is technically impossible or because validation techniques do not apply; here, a lack of necessary information causes the
failure. See Bartholet, supra note 12, at 986. Moreover, validation in its technical sense is not the
question; instead, the question is whether a relationship exists between the challenged criterion and
the employer's goal. Lamber, supra note 127, at 46 n. 173.
179. Although the Court has not addressed the issue directly, several decisions suggest some
limitation on the scope of a justification unrelated to job performance. In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,
434 U.S. 136 (1977), the Court considered an employer's policy of denying accumulated seniority to
employees returning to work from mandatory maternity leaves. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Court, stated that "[i]f a company's business necessitates the adoption of particular leave policies,
• . . Title VII is not violated ..
" Nevertheless, "since there was no proof of any business necessity adduced with respect to the policies in question," id. at 143, the Court did not analyze the scope
of the defense. See also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (collectively bargained seniority system that perpetuated past discrimination against blacks and Hispanics);
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (exclusion of pregnancy disabilities from an employer's disability insurance program). Because the decisions rest on other issues, the Court did not
consider the nature of the defendant's justification burden. See also Williams, supra note 122, at 68993.
180. See, eg., Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007, 1016 (2d Cir. 1980) (question is
whether discretion is necessary).
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sion-making process."'
If the court finds that discretion is appropriate, the employer should
have no further burden. Some might argue that such an employer should
have the minimal burden of articulating the basis of its discretion. To
avoid a charge of intentional discrimination, the employer will probably
attempt to do so.
But in cases of pure hunch, the employer may have
1 82
nothing to say.

VI. CONCLUSION
This article's suggestion that the disparate impact theory and its analytical framework are appropriate for analyzing discretionary decisions
under Title VII does not require employers to abandon discretion. Nor
do the policies of Title VII require automatic judicial approval of all such
decisions. Once it is clear that the disparate impact theory simply triggers limited judicial scrutiny, not automatic abolition or approval, the
183
major reason for immunizing discretion disappears.
The application of the disparate impact theory to discretionary decisions is different from those situations that the Supreme Court has considered. The analytical framework for typical disparate impact cases,
familiar to lower courts and litigants, does not always work the same way
in challenges to discretionary decisions. The disparate impact theory and
its analytical framework, however, are useful ways to ask the right questions. Because an employer's exercise of discretion poses risks to the employment opportunities of women and other minority group members,
courts should be cautious about foregoing their scrutiny. The key to a
limited and principled deference to discretionary decisions is a proper
understanding of the nature of discretion and the employer's sincerity in
using it compared to its limitations for women and other minorities.
These are not simple solutions. But discrimination and discretion are not
simple problems.

181. Most of the literature concerns the possibility and desirability of validating subjective criteria and thus focuses on the first question. See, eg., supra notes 171-72. More likely, however, the
plaintiff will challenge the appropriateness of the discretion.
182. A plaintiff can maintain other challenges to the employer's action. The plaintiff can allege
intentional discrimination, especially if a sufficient number of decisions show a pattern raising an
inference of gender discrimination. The plaintiff also can argue that certain factors are determinative, even though the employer claims that they are not.
183. The point is similar to that in Ely, Legislative and Administration Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1207 (1970) (inquiry into legislative motivation does not make motive dispositive).

